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Executive Summary
This report examines how courts in the UK and Europe respond when human rights and
security appear to conflict. It compares cases from the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Spain, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It examines how rights are
applied and how courts use the concept of proportionality to mediate conflicts between rights
and security. The report concludes that British courts are less consistent in their application
of proportionality than countries with constitutional rights protections which tend to be more
rigorous in their protections of rights than are countries, like the UK, that rely instead on the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Proportionality and balancing
At its most rigorously applied, proportionality requires a multi- stage analysis. First, the court
must ask whether the purpose of any rights restriction is legitimate. Second, the court must
then ask whether the measure in question is suitable to attaining the identified purpose.
Third, the court must ask whether the measure is necessary for the attainment of the
purpose. Finally, the court must establish whether the measure is proportionate in the strict
sense, namely whether it strikes a proper balance between the purpose and the individuals’
rights in question.

Proportionality as a legal concept must be distinguished from the concept of balancing.
Balancing, as identified in this report, involves a broad brush, and sometimes opaque,
analysis aimed at a resolution of the interests and rights involved. When balancing, courts
are effectively applying a utilitarian analysis of the rights and public interest goals in question,
giving no significantly greater weight to rights than to security measures.

Setting the scene
In order to understand differences in how jurisdictions mediate between rights and security, it
is necessary to understand structural differences between these five legal systems. Most
important is the fact that some jurisdictions, such as Germany and Spain, have domestic
constitutions that protect human rights in addition to applying the ECHR. Others, such as
France and the UK, rely instead on the ECHR itself as their primary rights instruments.
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Overall conclusions
First, British courts are not being overwhelmed with rights versus security cases. Since the
Human Rights Act came into force in 2000, only twenty-one cases involving a conflict
between rights and security have been decided by the House of Lords. With the exception of
France, the other jurisdictions included in this study had a similar number of cases. The
British Government’s success in these rights versus security cases does not vary
substantially from other European jurisdictions. Since 2000, the British Government won
domestic cases at about the same rate as the German Government, and lower only than
France in proportional terms.1 On this basis, it can be argued that the perception that the
British government’s security policies are more restricted by human rights considerations
than in other comparable European jurisdictions is open to question.

Second, proportionality plays a crucial role in deciding rights versus security cases.
Proportionality criteria were applied by courts in 70 percent of the cases in our selection. In
the remaining cases proportionality was typically not applied either because the right in
question is seen as absolute, such as with torture, or because the court chooses to simply
balance interests rather than use, or mention, proportionality. However, there is significant
variation between jurisdictions as to the consistency with which proportionality is applied.

Third, there is no single formulation of the proportionality principle. Courts across
jurisdictions vary considerably in the level of scrutiny they apply to government assertions
through the proportionality lens. In Germany and Spain, proportionality almost always
involves a rigorous four-stage enquiry. However, the picture is less consistent in the ECtHR,
France and the British House of Lords. In the UK in particular the House of Lords is more
prone to adopt a broad brush balancing approach. Moreover, even where proportionality is
applied British courts appear to be more forgiving of government assertions than in other
countries except France. Hence, the importance of proportionality and the impact it has on
case outcomes varies depending the jurisdiction.

Fourth, while all jurisdictions have some concept of deference, margin of appreciation or
evaluative leeway, there are significant differences between these jurisdictions as to how
these ideas are applied, articulated and understood. As a supra-national court the ECtHR
has developed the margin of appreciation doctrine in order to afford greater respect to the
1

The French case example is complex however. Although in proportional terms the French government wins at
the highest rate, in absolute terms the French government has lost more security versus rights cases than the UK
government since 2000: 13 versus 12, respectively.
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democratic decisions of the signatory states to the Convention. The British House of Lords
has developed a strong and autonomous concept of “judicial deference,” and references to
deference have been frequent in human rights decisions since the HRA entered into force in
2000. The Spanish constitutional court splits its jurisprudence between greater deference to
legislative decisions and close scrutiny of administrative decisions. The German FCC does
not use the term deference, but applies a very narrow concept of evaluative leeway which is
interpreted in light of the right to “effective legal protection.” The term déference does not
appear in French law, however the Conseil d’Etat affords the administration some evaluative
leeway in its decision-making. The Conseil constitutionnel is also conscious of the
respective competences of the branches of government and will sometimes refrain from
substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature.

Fifth, the decisive factor in determining the importance of proportionality and the approach of
courts in human rights versus security cases across jurisdictions is the existence of a
domestic charter of rights. Courts with constitutional systems that include their own charter
of rights – such as in Germany and Spain – are more consistent and rigorous in their
application of proportionality to rights versus security cases than other jurisdictions which rely
solely on the ECHR. This is almost certainly linked to the fact that courts under these
domestic constitutions are vested with significant constitutional authority to scrutinize their
respective governments and parliaments in the light of constitutional rights. As a
consequence, a “British Bill of Rights” would most likely result in stricter rights protections in
British courts.

Sixth, proportionality analysis varies depending on the right in question as well as the
relevant jurisdiction.
•

Torture: Courts across all jurisdictions are consistent in their view that questions of
security cannot be a basis for limiting the rights provided under Article 3 ECHR or
other prohibitions on torture, and that the right to be free form torture is not subject to
balancing exercises. Nevertheless, in both the German and the ECHR jurisprudence,
proportionality of the penalty to the crime does enter into the equation when
interpreting whether treatment constitutes torture.

•

Liberty: All jurisdictions apply the doctrine of proportionality to the question of
whether states fall within the exceptions to the right to liberty, however the intensity of
proportionality review varies considerably across jurisdictions. At the one end of the
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spectrum the ECtHR and the UK courts are inclined to balance rights and interests
against each other, while at the other end of the spectrum the German court applies a
strict necessity test for any deprivation of liberty.
•

Fair trial rights: Fair trial rights are frequently subjected to a proportionality analysis.
However, in the ECtHR, the UK and Spain there is a considerable blurring of
balancing and proportionality. The German FCC on the other hand applies a strict
proportionality test and frequently returns to the important idea of the ‘core of the
right’ when determining restrictions on fair trial rights.

•

Privacy: A rigorous proportionality test has played a decisive role in protecting the
privacy related rights of applicants in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, France.
In the UK the doctrine has not been as consistently or strictly applied. While the Daly
case has shown a stringent application of proportionality review, other cases tend
towards a balancing of privacy rights against security measures. In Klass, the ECtHR
refers not to proportionality, but to strict necessity – yet in Segerstedt-Wiberg,
proportionality and strict necessity are both required.

•

Family life: The French and ECtHR cases demonstrate that family life cases,
perhaps more than any other human right, are determined predominantly by the
application of proportionality strictu sensu, rather than by questions of the legitimacy
and necessity of the rights limiting measures cited by states.

•

Expression: Courts in all selected jurisdictions apply the proportionality analysis
most rigorously and consistently with respect to freedom of speech. They are also
less inclined to develop a strong doctrine of deference or evaluative leeway in this
context. Despite this, courts in all jurisdictions are also broadly sympathetic to the
state’s need to restrict freedom of expression where potential or actual terrorist
activity is involved.

•

Association: The ECtHR has the most stringent proportionality requirements with
respect to freedom of association relative to the other jurisdictions in this selection.
However, it is difficult on the sample available to draw very clear comparative
conclusions. In all cases where the restriction on the right to association was upheld,
the organisations in question were characterised by the courts as posing a threat to
the basic democratic values of the State.
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Part 1
1.1

Introduction

Aim of the report

Perhaps one of the most difficult issues facing the United Kingdom today is how best to
reconcile a commitment to fundamental human rights with the need to provide the public with
security and protection. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, courts in the United Kingdom
are responsible for ensuring that any rights restrictions are consistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The results are often controversial, and in recent
years the debate surrounding the relationship between rights and security in Britain has only
intensified. Calls for a ‘rebalancing’ are common, with three recent government reports
addressing the issue (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2006; The Home Office 2006;
Department of Constitutional Affairs 2006).

This report compares recent human rights cases in several jurisdictions – the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Spain – with a
view to putting the current debate over rights and security in its broader European context.
In particular, it considers whether courts in the United Kingdom are more rights regarding
than their European counterparts, and as such less willing to allow government to place
restrictions on those rights in the name of security and public safety. Finally, it examines how
different European courts have attempted to resolve conflicts between rights and security
using concepts such as proportionality and the margin of appreciation, and considers
whether less formal exercises in balancing – as sometimes employed by Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords – are consistent with a commitment to these more established human
rights principles.

1.2

Balancing, proportionality, and margins of appreciation

The report has identified three concepts which the courts apply in our selected jurisdictions in
order to resolve the conflict between security measures and human rights: proportionality,
balancing and the margin of appreciation.

At its most rigorously applied, proportionality requires a four stage analysis. First the court
must ask whether the purpose of any rights restriction is legitimate, namely that it is foreseen
by the rights instrument in question or is determined by the court to be a legitimate
democratic purpose. Second, the court must then ask whether the measure in question is
suitable to attaining the identified purpose. Third, the court must ask whether the measure is
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necessary for the attainment of the purpose, namely whether it is the least restrictive
measure available for achieving the purpose in question. Finally, the court must establish
whether the measure is proportionate in the strict sense, namely whether it strikes a proper
balance between the purpose and the individuals’ rights in question. Applied in this way, the
proportionality matrix serves legal transparency in demonstrating clearly how rights
arguments are resolved. This report reveals significant variations in the rigor with which
courts apply the proportionality test across jurisdictions and shows that courts sometimes
only focus on one or two stages of the proportionality analysis.

Proportionality as a legal concept must be distinguished from the concept of balancing which
courts, particularly in the UK, sometimes adopt in order to resolve the conflict between
security and rights. Balancing, as identified in this report, involves a broad brush, and
sometimes opaque, analysis aimed at a resolution of the interests at stake and the rights
involved. Unlike proportionality, it does not operate from a presumption that public interest
goals must be restricted by rights, or that rights take precedence over public interest goals
which are not suitable and necessary to their purpose. Rather, when balancing, courts are
effectively applying a utilitarian analysis of the rights and public interest goals in question,
giving no significantly greater weight to rights than to security measures. The balancing
which takes place at the fourth stage of the proportionality test - proportionality strictu sensu
– must also be distinguished here. It is one thing to ask at the outset whether the rights and
measures are ‘balanced’ in a broad utilitarian sense, it is another to ask this question after
the first three stages of the proportionality test have been fully satisfied.

Alongside proportionality, as well as balancing, courts apply the margin of appreciation
doctrine in order to afford some leeway to the democratic or specialist decision maker in their
appreciation and weighting of the relevant factors involved in the case. The margin of
appreciation doctrine is however variously applied and manifests in different ways in different
jurisdictions. While the ECtHR applies the doctrine as a supra-national court to afford leeway
to the jurisdictions over which it presides, UK courts have developed the doctrine in a
number of ways. Sometimes UK courts refer to a ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘discretionary
area of judgment’, while other times they refer to notions of ‘deference’ to the decision
maker. In other jurisdictions, such as Germany, the courts refer to an ‘evaluative leeway’ on
the part of the decision maker. This variation in terminology reflects also a difference in the
weight given to the doctrine and the extent to which the courts in different jurisdictions defer
to governments in the application of security measures.
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1.3

Methodology

This report is based on a comparison of key human rights cases involving questions of
security and public protection decided primarily since January 2000. In total, some 192
cases were considered, making this report the most comprehensive study of its kind to date.
Broadly speaking, this report engages in two types of analysis: first, quantitative comparisons
between jurisdictions, such as how many cases were decided, how often proportionality was
applied, and at what rate governments win rights versus security cases. For these
quantitative comparisons, we looked solely at cases decided since 2000, in order to obtain
comparable samples between jurisdictions. This does not apply to table 1, below, which
identifies trends in the relationship between rights claims and security claims, rather than
comparing trends between jurisdictions, and includes pre-2000 cases. The second type of
analysis in this report is qualitative, comprising an in-depth examination of the case law and
jurisprudence in the rights versus security context for each jurisdiction. In this qualitative
analysis, we have chosen to include some cases decided before 2000. This inclusion was
necessary because for many jurisdictions – in particular Germany – human rights
jurisprudence has a long history. Key principles were developed prior to 2000; excluding
such cases would thus give an incomplete view of the law. 2 For that reason, some pre-2000
cases have been included in our qualitative examination of the case law.

A full description of the methodology adopted can be found in Annex One, but for the
purposes of this introduction it is important to note that each of the jurisdictions chosen has
both an established human rights jurisprudence and extensive experience of dealing with
serious threats to public order and national security. As a consequence, although there may
be many differences between the legal systems considered in this report, they have all
grappled with similar rights and security issues in recent years. Furthermore, regardless of
their domestic human rights frameworks, all of the countries included for comparison are
signatories to the ECHR and recognise the rights and principles set out in the Convention.

2

Selecting these older cases required attention to several factors: in many jurisdictions, the most significant factor
was citation in later decisions. If a pre-2000 case was cited as determining a principle of law that bears on the
rights versus security conflict, we included that older case in our data. Another factor in our search for older
cases was academic literature. Cases described as important by this academic literature were also included,
even if they were decided before 2000.
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1.4

Structure of the report

Following this introduction, which comprises Chapter 1 of the report, the report is divided into
two additional parts. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the system of constitutional and
human rights protection in each of the jurisdictions included in the report. It also alludes to
the security threats within each jurisdiction. In Chapter 3, decisions of the ECtHR and various
national courts are compared, with discussion organised around those rights most frequently
raised in cases involving issues of security and public protection, with particular attention
being paid to questions of proportionality and balance. Finally, Chapter 4 provides a general
overview of the key issues identified in the report, and a discussion of the relationship
between rights and proportionality in the context of security and the ECHR.
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Part 2

Setting the scene

This section provides a brief introduction to the history, legal culture and system of rights
protection in each of the jurisdictions examined in this report. Although it is not possible to
provide a comprehensive account of all the relevant distinctions between the jurisdictions, it
is nevertheless important to draw attention to a number of key differences, most notably as
regards the role of the ECHR in domestic human rights law and its relationship to existing
constitutional rights frameworks.

2.1

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

Historical background and legal framework
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was created in 1998, and immediately
replaced the older system that relied on both the European Commission of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR is now the primary body responsible
for interpreting and enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). A Council
of Europe project, the Convention came into force in 1953 and was designed to implement
and protect some of the rights enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The ECHR describes a set of rights and provides, in some cases, for restrictions or
limitations to be placed on those rights, with Article 1 of the Convention obliging parties to
‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of
this Convention.’ Under the original scheme of the Convention, individuals who believed that
their Convention rights had been violated by a state party could apply for relief to the
European Commission on Human Rights, which then had the power to bring cases before
the ECtHR. In 1998, however, Protocol 11 to the Convention came into force, which provided
individual claimants with direct access to the new ECtHR. The Convention is made up of
absolute rights, such as the right against torture, rights which are subject to exceptions, such
as the rights to life and liberty, and rights which are subject to express limitations, such as
the right to freedom of expression. For some of these rights, derogation – the possibility for
States to opt-out of certain Convention obligations under narrow and specified conditions- is
also possible under Article 15 ECHR.3

The ECtHR exists by virtue of international law and is not itself part of any domestic system.
The Court is not sovereign – that is, it has no direct means to enforce its judgments – nor
does it have any special relationship with individual member states. The ECtHR therefore
3

No derogations are allowed for Articles 2, 3, 4(1) and 7.
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plays a very different role compared to that of national courts, which may have the power to
overturn decisions of the state or declare particular state practices and policies unlawful. In
practice, this means that the ECtHR is on the one hand more independent than certain
domestic courts, but on the other often more hesitant to use its power than those same
courts. The Court has consistently to face the tension between upholding individual rights
and the political reality of rendering judgments against the same sovereign countries that
created the Court in the first place.

Constitutional culture and the development of principles
Multiple concerns guide the Court’s thinking on human rights cases. The court occupies a
unique position, standing in some ways above national systems but also as a bridge between
countries with distinct legal systems. The Court draws from common and civil law traditions,
but has ultimately developed its own constitutional culture. One aspect of this culture is of
particular importance: respect for national decisions, or as the court refers to it the margin of
appreciation doctrine.4 The Court’s respect for state-level decisions stems from its status as
a supranational institution: ‘the supranational character of the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights may induce deference and self-restraint in respect of conclusions
reached at the national level as to the appropriateness of restrictions on rights and freedoms’
(McBride 1999, p.25).

Although it has come to be recognized as one of the central principles governing the
application of the rights and freedoms contained within the Convention, the concept of
proportionality is not specifically mentioned in its text or in any of its additional Protocols
(McBride 1999, p.23). Proportionality entered Convention jurisprudence by way of the
limitations clauses, clauses that require restrictions on rights – such as Article 8, the right to
private and family life – to be ‘necessary in a democratic society.’5 In order to judge whether
specific restrictions placed upon these rights are justifiable, the Strasbourg court has turned
to proportionality, a concept originally developed in German administrative and constitutional
law.

Significantly, the proportionality of a state measure may also be relevant in considerations of
whether absolute rights have been violated. Articles 3 (the prohibition on torture) and 6

4

For a detailed examination of the origins of the margin of appreciation, see Yourow, Howard Charles, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, Kluwer Law
International: London (1996).
5
ECHR, Articles 8 (family life and privacy), 10 (expression), 11 (association).
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(the right to a fair trial) fall in this category. Finally, proportionality is also used to judge
whether state measures fall within exceptions to the right to liberty provided under Article 5.

Recent issues in rights and security
Limitations to Convention rights must be justified; if they are not, they violate the Convention.
Often, state parties appearing before the ECtHR argue that it is necessary to limit rights in
order to protect security. Because limitations on rights are often justified by reference to
security concerns, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR reflects the changing and diverse threats
faced across Europe. Instead of describing a set of inflexible rules, the Convention has
created a dialogue between states, individuals, and courts that moulds and shapes rights
over time. For that reason, it is impossible to understand the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
without understanding the security threats faced by parties to the Convention.

Perhaps the most significant – and certainly the most conspicuous – type of threat that has
been considered by the Court in recent years is terrorism. However, it is actually rare for
member states to cite concerns about terrorism or the need to combat terrorist activities as a
reason for limiting Convention rights when defending cases before the ECtHR.6 Instead, a
more prosaic threat occupies the greatest bulk of cases, namely the fear of crime. The most
common type of case to appear before the Court involves the deportation of convicted
criminals, in which the need to prevent future crime is used to justify limitations on
Convention rights.7

2.2

The United Kingdom

Historical background and legal framework
In the absence of a written constitution, individual rights in the United Kingdom have
traditionally been protected by a combination of parliamentary legislation and the common
law. This historical position was fundamentally altered in 1966 when individual petitions to
the European Commission on Human Rights were allowed. Yet despite this reform – and the
effect of latter amendments to the convention via Protocol 11 – until 1998 the enforcement of
many basic human rights remained essentially a matter of international, not domestic, law in
the United Kingdom (Feldman 1999, p.165-66). Under the new regime created by the Human
Rights Act 1998, however, UK courts are now obliged to interpret domestic legislation so that
it is compatible with the ECHR and, where this is not possible, are empowered to issue a
6

Three such cases were identified that met the criteria for inclusion in this report: Chahal v United Kingdom,
Dogan v Turkey, and Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland.
7
Typically article 8 rights to family life. Five such cases met the criteria for this report: Uner v the Netherlands,
Yildiz v Austria, Radavanovic v Austria, Jakupovic v Austria and Boultif v Switzerland.

7

declaration of incompatibility. Although such declarations do not affect the status of the given
legislation and are not binding on Parliament, they nevertheless represent an important
mechanism for the protection of rights in the UK, while also preserving the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty.

Before the Human Rights Act, the British constitutional system lacked a set of clearly stated,
enumerated human rights. Due to the relative continuity of local democratic traditions,
constitutional conventions, and state institutions, successive governments have not felt the
need to formalise such rights. The changes brought about by the Human Rights Act clearly
represent a break with traditional thinking about rights in the United Kingdom, establishing for
the first time a set of defined rights that can be readily identified and which are enforced by
courts endowed with substantial powers of review (Lazarus 2004, ch. 6).

Constitutional culture and the development of principles
Although the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom does not emphasize the formal
separation of powers, a strong tradition of judicial independence has emerged as a result of
informal but effective constitutional conventions. According to these conventions, courts and
the judiciary are apolitical and should be wholly free from political influence. This traditional
vision of the judiciary has had important implications for the development and exercise of
judicial review and the protection of individual rights in the UK. Given that the courts have
had no legitimate role to play in the formulation of policy-making, their role has been confined
to checking the legality, as opposed to the merits, of executive actions (Lazarus 2004, ch. 6).
As for acts of Parliament, strict adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
historically constrained the ability of the courts to perform meaningful legislative review.

The Human Rights Act 1998 demands a different role for courts. By requiring courts to
decide whether the limitations placed on rights are justified, it obliges judges to investigate
the merits of state and executive actions. Furthermore, by providing courts with the power to
issue declarations of incompatibility, the Act also requires some level of judicial oversight
over Parliament. As a consequence of these changes, the Act has led to a significant shift in
the constitutional culture of the United Kingdom, placing the doctrine of separation of powers
under increasing strain, and requiring the judiciary to take a more active role in the protection
of rights and the review of state action.

Evolving standards of judicial review have also led courts to question the level of deference
they must give to the legislative and executive branches of government. Before the Human
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Rights Act, deference in the human rights context was intertwined with the Wednesbury
standard of review.8 Wednesbury review, even where reformulated as ‘anxious scrutiny’ in
the human rights context,9 implies, if not requires, a high level of deference to the political
branches of government. However, with the introduction of proportionality review in 1998,
the question of how much and in what instances the courts should defer to the will of
parliament and the government was reopened.

Interestingly, since the Human Rights Act entered into force recourse to the language of
deference has been ubiquitous in judicial analysis of Convention rights in the United
Kingdom. Faced with a conflict between the generous (to the government) Wednesbury
standard and more restrictive visions of deference applied in Strasbourg in the wake of the
Human Rights Act, British courts have charted their own path and developed what has been
referred to as an ‘autonomous concept of deference’. This notion of deference is
distinguished by the fact that it is not static – that is, it changes with context – and explicitly
leaves open the possibility of judicial scrutiny.10 In particular, it outlines those areas in which
the government and Parliament have greater – but not absolute – discretion as regards the
exercise of legislative authority and the limitation of rights (R v A (No2) 2001, para. 58).11
This newly evolved concept of deference now influences, informs, and sometimes
determines the work of judges as they review limitations on human rights in the United
Kingdom.12

Recent issues in rights and security
The most obvious security threat faced by the United Kingdom is terrorism. The tension
between the need to respond to threats of terrorism and the commitment to protecting
individual rights has been a constant theme in British human rights law, and has informed
political and legal debates over how best to deal with the challenges posed by the IRA in the
1970s and Al-Qaida today. Recent attacks in the United States, Spain, and Britain have
served to underscore this danger, and have ensured that terrorism will continue to be
regarded as the one of the most serious threats facing Britain in the twenty-first century.
8

Wednesbury review requires courts to ask the question: could a reasonable decision-maker have made this
decision? If the answer is yes, the decision stands. It is one of the weakest forms of judicial review known to the
common law.
9
Ex p. Smith [1996] QB 517, 554.
10
See R (Kebeline) v DPP [1998] 4 All ER 801, 844; R v Lambert [2001] HRLR 4, para 16; Brown v Stott [2001]
HRLR 9, para 58.
11
For the ongoing argument about levels of deference, see Secretary of State for the Home Department v
Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153.
12
A number of different types of deference have been formulated by British courts. Due deference, discretionary
area of judgment, degrees of deference, weight given to the legislature are all terms used by the courts. See
Lazarus 2004, 6.1.3.1.
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This said, other threats and state responses to them have also had a significant effect on the
development of human rights law in the UK. In particular, the need to combat illegal
immigration and organized crime has been cited by the government as a reason to limit
certain rights, and to enact legislation that expands the power of criminal justice agents.
Terrorism is cited less often by the British government in human rights cases than are these
more everyday threats.

2.3

Germany

Historical background and legal framework
The German constitution, called the ‘Basic Law’ for historical reasons,13 is in most important
respects a reaction to, and rejection of, the horrors of the Third Reich, which many
constitutional historians link to the breakdown of the Weimar Republic. In aiming to avoid the
mistakes of the Weimar Constitution – in which all rights were subject to parliamentary
amendment – the Basic Law places basic rights at the head of the text of the Constitution,14
declaring as unamendable the right to human dignity and the Democratic, Social, Federal
and Rechtsstaat principles.15 It also ensures that all State institutions are obliged to ‘respect
and protect’ basic rights.16 The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is afforded extensive
powers of legislative review and citizens have direct access to this Court.17

As regards the ECHR, the German FCC takes the view that the Convention is simple federal
law as opposed to ‘Basic Law’. Hence under domestic law, the German Basic Law
supersedes the Convention. However, the Courts will recognize the Convention alongside
the Basic Law where the protective potential of the rights contained therein go further than
those contained under the Convention.

13

The Basic Law was originally created with the intent of forming an interim constitution for what was then West
Germany. Because of this temporary nature, the term ‘constitution’ was avoided. Yet the document proved so
successful that the Basic Law as retained even after reunification,
14
Basic Law, arts 1-19. For further basic rights, see Basic Law, arts 20(4), 33, 38, 101, 103, 104. Despite the
exclusion of these rights from the first chapter of the Constitution, they are still considered to be fundamental.
15
Basic Law, art 79(3): ‘Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their
participation in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in arts 1 and 20 shall be prohibited’.
16
Basic Law, art 1(3): 'The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as
directly enforceable law'.
17
Basic Law, art 19(4), art 93(1)(4a).
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Constitutional culture and the development of principles
As a consequence of the constitutional powers of the FCC and the political and legal culture
in which it operates, the FCC has developed a broad and extensive conception of human
rights. Since its earliest jurisprudence, it has viewed basic rights both as subjectively held
and also as a ‘system of values’ or ‘objective norms’ which radiate through the whole legal
system (Alexy 1990; Böckenförde 1990; Jarass 1985). Alongside the notion of constitutional
rights as ‘objective norms and values’ is the view of basic rights as not only negative limits to
State intervention, but also as positive justifications for State action. In short, basic rights,
and the FCC as the court set up ultimately to protect them, constitute the cornerstone of
modern German democracy and a defining feature of its political, legal and constitutional
culture.

Basic rights may be limited where the Basic Law provides for legal reservations
(Gesetzesvorbehalte). Moreover, the FCC has developed a doctrine of ‘constitutional
limitations’ (verfassungsimmanente Schranken) whereby basic rights may be limited by other
basic rights or further constitutional norms. Though some basic rights are not subject to any
limitation, such as the right to human dignity (Basic Law, Article 1(1)) and the right to equality
(Basic Law, Article 3), most basic rights are subject to some kind of legal or constitutionally
immanent limitation.

The FCC is clear that the onus rests on the State to justify any rights limitations. Without
legal authority to encroach upon individual rights State encroachments would be struck
down. Rights limitations cannot simply be justified through the legislative process, as these
infringements must accord with the fundamental principles of the Basic Law.18 Where the
constitution foresees the limitation of a basic right, a number of principles must be followed.
Many of these principles stem from the Rechtsstaatsprinzip (rule of law), but are also
referred to independently under the umbrella term of ‘limits of limits’ (Schranken-Schranken)
(Pieroth and Schlink 1997, p. 6473). Included in the notion of Schranken-Schranken is the
“essence guarantee,” set out in Article 19(2) Basic Law, which sets an absolute limit beyond
which no basic right can be restricted by asserting that each right has an inviolable essence
or core (Pieroth and Schlink 1997, p.70; Jarass and Pieroth 2002, p.471).
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Under Basic Law, art. 20(3) the legislature is bound by the constitutional order and is therefore duty bound to
respect basic rights in the content and shape of legislation.
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Rights restrictions short of those which infringed upon the ‘essence’ of a right are also
subject to limitation. These limitations must be proportionate. The doctrine of proportionality,
developed in Germany in the nineteenth century, stipulates that State measures be ‘suitable’
and ‘necessary’ for attaining a legitimate (i.e. constitutional or legal) purpose, and
‘proportionate’ in the narrow sense (Degenhart 1997, p.128-33). Such is the centrality of
proportionality in German constitutional and legal reasoning that Schlink, a leading
constitutional scholar in Germany, has argued for a separate constitutional principle called
‘the proportionate law proviso’ (Pieroth and Schlink, p.63).19 Another way in which
proportionality is described in Germany is as the ‘prohibition of excess’ principle
(Übermaßverbot).

Article 19(4) of the Basic Law stipulates that ‘where rights are violated by public authority the
person affected shall have recourse to law’. Sentence 2 of Article 19(4) stipulates that this
will normally result, unless otherwise specified, in recourse to the ordinary courts. This
article has come to be known as establishing the principle of ‘effective legal protection’ which
the FCC has taken to mean that a citizen has a right to a thorough judicial assessment of the
challenged measure in legal and factual terms. It is therefore clear that the constitution
normally requires a dense judicial assessment, through the proportionality matrix, of any
legislative or administrative act which infringes upon the basic rights of the individual.
Nevertheless, judicial oversight of human rights does not preclude the possibility of the
courts allowing for leeway in the determination of details, in the exercise of discretion and in
the exercise of evaluation of facts. The test is whether the leeway allowed is consistent with
the level of judicial scrutiny required by the right to effective legal protection. Hence, as a
consequence of Article 19(4) Basic Law, the circumstances in which such leeway or ‘margin
of appreciation’ is acknowledged are limited.

Recent issues in rights and security
Germany has considerable experience of terrorist activity, from the activities of the Red Army
Faction (RAF/Baader-Meinhof Gang) in the 1970s to the threats from Al-Qaida today. The
FCC has taken a pro-active role in determining the political response to terrorism. Its
approach to anti-terrorist measures has matured over time with the Court showing less
inclination to accept overly oppressive measures today than it did in the 1970s. Most
recently the FCC struck down provisions of the Aviation Security Act, a law passed in
response to terrorist activities of 9/11 that gave powers to shoot down aircraft which had
19

See below.
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been hijacked with the intention of using them ‘as weapons in crimes against human lives’.
The court argued that these measures violated the essence of the right to life and the right to
human dignity of the innocent passengers on the plane, who had been made into the mere
objects of State action directed at the security of others.

German human rights jurisprudence responds to other threats as well: border security and
the prevention of crime also play a role in the cases studied. As later sections in the report
will show, the FCC has played a vigilant role in limiting state measures that violate its
conception of the proportionality principle.

2.4

France

Historical background and legal framework
The idea of human rights first came to prominence in France during the 1789 Revolution.
The 1789 Declaration of Human Rights stood as the cornerstone of public liberties in French
law for decades, casting the legislature as the primary guardian of fundamental rights and
freedoms. That role was not, however, always fulfilled, and it was only after the enactment of
the 1958 Constitution that the freedoms contained in the 1789 Declaration, the Preamble to
the 1946 Constitution and the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic
acquired a higher place in the hierarchy of legal norms. Following a 1971 judgment in which
the Conseil Constitutionnel accepted that it could hold acts of parliament to be
unconstitutional where they violated fundamental human rights, France then ratified the
ECHR in 1974, bringing the rights contained within it into domestic law (16 July, 1971). As a
consequence, although the French Constitution does not contain a charter of rights, French
courts may look to the rights and freedoms contained in the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de
l’Homme et du Citoyen, the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, the ECHR, and legislation
enacted by Parliament in order to regulate the exercise of certain rights (Bell, 1992:138).

In addition, according to Article 55 of the 1946 Constitution, the provisions of international
treaties ratified by France are superior to domestic law. The administration is therefore
obliged to conform with normes internationals, and individuals may invoke such normes
before French courts (CE Ass 30-05-1952 Dame Kirkwood). If a norme internationale conflicts
with a French statute, the Cour de cassation resolves the conflict in favour of the
international norm (Directeur general des douanes c Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre,
1975:336), whereas the Conseil d’Etat would hold that the Conseil constitutionnel was the
only proper forum to review the constitutionality of a statute and thus apply the French
statute (Brown and Bell, 1998:284).
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Constitutional culture and the development of principles
Separation of powers is one of the founding principles of the 5th Republic (Vincent,
2002:1139). It appears in Article 16 of the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du
Citoyen and in the loi constitutionelle of 3rd June 1958, according to which ‘the executive
power and the legislative power should be separated in a way that the Government and the
Parliament assume all of their competences each for its own part and under its own
responsibility’. The Conseil d’Etat sits on top of the administrative courts and retains for
historical reasons its position as the supreme administrative organ of the State and official
advisor of the Government, whose President is the President of the Republic. This does not
affect the Conseil d’Etat’s impartiality as a court since the President’s role is purely
ceremonial (Brown and Bell:64).

Constitutional review was formally launched by the Conseil constitutionnel in 1971 (CC 1971
Liberté d’association). However, constitutional principles were present in the field of judicial
review before 1971. The Conseil d’Etat guaranteed the freedoms and liberties of the French
recognised by the 1789 Déclaration effectively long before the Conseil Constitutionnel was
established. The existence of human rights in public law can be traced as far back as the
ruling of the Tribunal des conflits in Dugrave in 1873, where a right in private life and property
was acknowledged.

Although the Conseil d’Etat has itself never used the phrase ‘principle of proportionality’,
various academic authors and judges have claimed that this principle is part of French law.
Proportionality was introduced by Commissaire G. Braibant, commissaire du gouvernement,
in CE 1971 Ville Nouvelle-Est., and the Conseil d’Etat accepted his submissions. Both
Commissaire Braibant and Conseiller d’Etat Costa argue that proportionality has been
implicitly applied by French judges (1988, p. 434). They agree that proportionality is applied
in three fields: (i) limitations to civil liberties; (ii) manifest error of appreciation; and (iii) the
‘bilan coût-avantages’ or balancing of cost and benefits theory.

There is no concept of deference in French administrative law, primarily for historical reasons.
The Conseil d’Etat was established in the 19th century as a public body that would sit above all
other administrative authorities and would directly oversee and control their activities. It was
thus inconceivable that it would defer to public bodies that were inferior to it. This assumption
survives today even though the Conseil d’Etat is considered to be a court. Nonetheless, the
Conseil d’Etat does give some leeway to the administration in certain situations. One of these
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occasions is covered by the ‘actes de gouvernement’ doctrine, according to which the courts
will not review acts concerning the relations between the Government and Parliament as well
as the relations between the Government and foreign States or international organisations
(Brown and Bell 1998, p. 162). The courts will also provide leeway to the administration when
the legislature has granted discretion to the latter, especially with regard to highly technical
matters. In such occasions, the courts will review the administrative act for an “erreur
manifeste d’appréciation” or a manifest error of appreciation.

The idea of manifest error of appreciation constitutes an implicit application of the principle of
proportionality, as it requires a judge to inquire whether there is a manifest disproportion
between the motives of the act and its content (Costa 1988, p. 435). This enquiry requires
the judge to substitute his judgment for that of the administration and thus the margin of
discretion accorded to the public body vanishes. This is even more evident in the human
rights context where the court substitutes its own judgment for that of the administration to
ascertain for itself whether a human rights violation has been committed.

Although the term déference is not used by French courts, analogous concepts do exist in
the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel. The first and most frequent analogue is
when the Conseil constitutionnel states that it is the task of the legislature to take measures
to safeguard the public interest and to ensure conciliation between the latter and the exercise
of civil liberties.20 The second and considerably rarer analogue takes the form of true
deference where the Conseil constitutionnel enunciates that it cannot ‘substitute its own
judgment to that of the legislature’ (CC 13.03.2003 Loi pour la sécurité interieure).

Recent issues in rights and security
Security arguments made by French authorities are typically linked with the prevention or
suppression of ordinary crime (such as murder and other bodily harm, robbery, rape, drug
traffic, possession and use of weapons etc). In the vast majority of other security-related
cases, the primary focus has been on issues of deportation, particularly of Algerian nationals
originating from the Maghreb. In the few cases where specific questions of terrorism have
arisen, most have concerned threats from Spanish and Algerian terrorists, although similar
security issues were also raised in cases involving French national defence policy with
regard to the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia and the civil unrest in urban areas of
France during 2005.
20

CC 13.03.2003 Loi pour la sécurité interieure, CC 20.11.2003 Loi relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, au
séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité.
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2.5

Spain

Historical background and legal framework
The history of Spain during the 20th century is unlike that of most of the other countries in
Europe. After a bloody civil war between 1936 and 1939, General Franco seized power and
served as the head of an authoritarian regime until his death in 1975. This period was
characterized by an absence of civil liberties, minimal democratic participation, and the
political persecution of adversaries. In 1978 Spain adopted a new Constitution which – to a
certain extent – married the conservative concerns of Franco’s heirs with the democratic
aspirations of his enemies, among them the moderate Spanish Communist Party
(Woodworth 2001, p. 4). Spain then took the form of a parliamentary monarchy with a clear
commitment to popular sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law. Spain entered the
Council of Europe in 1977 and the European Community in January 1986.

The Spanish Constitution provides a substantive list of fundamental rights and freedoms,
which according to Section 53 of the Constitution are binding on all public authorities. In
addition, Section 10 states that provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties
recognized by the Constitution are to be construed in conformity with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international treaties ratified by Spain, such as the
ECHR. The ECHR was signed in November 1977 and ratified by Spain in October 1979, and
is frequently used by the Constitutional Court to aid in the interpretation of domestic rights
and freedoms (de Casadevante 1988, p. 27-44). The ECHR can be directly invoked before
the Spanish Courts and is binding upon them.

Constitutional culture and the development of principles
Spain is a constitutional monarchy with the Constitution providing for the separation of
powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. Several commentators have argued
that, regardless of its Constitutional design, the Spanish legislature is weak vis-à-vis the
control of executive power. This imbalance has led to the judiciary acquiring an unusually
high profile in Spanish public life (Woodworth, p. 442). The prominence of the judiciary is
ensured by the fact that the Spanish Constitution provides for the concept of administrative
legality, a legal requirement enforced through judicial control of the constitutionality of all
governmental and parliamentary decisions (Heywood 1995, p. 103-20).
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The Constitutional Court is the highest authority on the interpretation of the Constitution and
the constitutionality of laws in Spain. In particular, the Court has competence to decide two
types of fundamental constitutional questions. On the one hand, the Court examines appeals
(amparos) in cases in which a constitutional right may be affected by a particular decision of
an administrative or judicial body. On the other hand, it decides actions of unconstitutionality
(recurso de inconstitucionalidad and cuestión de inconstitucionalidad), which examine
whether a particular act, or a specific provision of that act, is compatible with the Spanish
Constitution.21 The Constitutional Court is concerned with violations to the bill of rights in the
Spanish Constitution. It has explicitly stated that it cannot make findings concerning whether
any of the provisions in the ECHR has been violated (such as STC 7/2004). Finally, unlike
most decisions of ‘ordinary’ courts in a civil law country, the decisions of the Constitutional
Court are binding for the lower Courts (STC 184/2003 and art. 5.1 of the Judicial
Organization Act).

Generally speaking, the Constitutional Court follows a four-stage proportionality analysis –
similar to that developed in German jurisprudence and the ECtHR – to determine whether
the restriction of a fundamental constitutional right is consistent with the Spanish
Constitution. In some instances, the Court explicitly refers to the German doctrine of the
“core of a right” (STC 7/2004). It is worth noting that the motivation or express justification of
a particular judicial decision restricting a fundamental right and the control of the way in
which these decisions are carried out are also considered part of this proportionality analysis
(STC 261/2005).

In the context of constitutional challenges, the Court has provided a significant degree of
leeway to the legislature and has established an extremely high threshold that must be met
before holding a specific legal provision inconsistent with the Constitution on grounds of
being disproportionate.22 For a legal provision to be disproportionate, the Court has
reasoned that a “patent and unreasonable or excessive imbalance must exist.” (STC
16/1997). In contrast, the Court rarely defers in cases involving the decisions of
administrative authorities (STC 11/2006).

21

The Court is competent in other issues that are not relevant for our project, such as conflicts with the autonomy
of the local communities or the control of constitutionality of international treaties to which Spain may be a party
(see http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/tribunal/competencias.html).
22
Stricto sensu refers to the last stage of the proportionality analysis.
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Recent issues in rights and security
Since the beginning of the transition to democracy, Spain has had to deal mainly with the
challenges posed by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA (Basque Fatherland and Freedom)
group, which adopted a policy of armed struggle in 1968. In 2004, Spain suffered what has
been the most terrible terrorist attack in its contemporary history with the bombings in the
Atocha railway station in Madrid by Islamic terrorists. Additional threats to security include
organized crime and illegal immigration, and as a consequence immigration policy and
border control have become highly sensitive political issues (see Ferris 2002, p.28-29).

2.6

Summary of the jurisdictions

Four key points emerge out of this survey of the jurisdictions: first, that every jurisdiction
studied deals with conflicts between human rights and security. Second, that all jurisdictions
apply some concept of proportionality, even if the concept varies across jurisdictions. Third,
all jurisdictions have some concept of deference, margin of appreciation or evaluative
leeway, although there are significant differences between these jurisdictions as to how
these are applied, articulated and understood. Finally there is the structural difference
between jurisdictions in terms of human rights protections. Some jurisdictions, such as
Germany and Spain, have domestic charters of rights in addition to applying the ECHR.
Others, such as France and the UK, rely instead on the ECHR itself as their primary rights
instruments. This difference proves to be the single most important distinction between
jurisdictions; it has implications for how cases are decided at not only the domestic level, but
also how states fare in cases before the ECtHR itself.
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Part 3
3.1

Case discussion

Overview of the data

In total, 192 cases were analysed for this report, 125 of which were decided since the year 2000.
Out of all 192 cases, 89 were from France, with the balance distributed evenly among the four
remaining jurisdictions. The human rights most frequently claimed in these cases were the right
to family life and fair trial rights. By far the most common claim to security was the prevention of
crime or disorder, followed by the need to protect against terrorism.
Table 1: Frequency of Rights and Security Claims
Rights

Security Arg

Freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment
Terrorism
Crime
Immigration
None
Liberty
Crime
Terrorism
Immigration
Disease
National Security
None
Fair trial and associated rights
Prosecution
Crime
Terrorism
Military
Prisons
None
Privacy
Prosecution
Terrorism
Prisons
Immigration
National Security
Crime
None
Family life
Crime
Terrorism
Immigration
None
Expression
National Security
Terrorism
Democracy
Crime
Prosecution
None
Association
National Security
Terrorism
Crime
Democracy

19

Cases
22
3
1
1
17
20
4
3
1
1
1
10
40
7
5
5
2
1
20
26
5
3
2
2
2
1
11
79
61
5
1
12
19
6
5
1
1
1
5
13
6
3
3
1

Table 1 shows the number of cases in which various rights and security arguments were cited.
Often, more than one right or security argument was raised in each case.

It demonstrates that rights and security claims are not randomly distributed: certain security
arguments tend to be made in the context of certain human rights. Most notably, out of the
79 cases that raised the right to family life, 61 of those cases involved a government
argument that a restriction on the right was necessary to prevent crime.

Focusing only on cases decided since the year 2000, proportionality criteria were applied by
courts in 70 percent of the cases. Significantly, governments won 46 percent of the cases in
which rights and security came into conflict.23 Table 2 provides an overview of the data. It
gives the number of cases for each jurisdiction as well as the percentage of those cases in
which the principle of proportionality was applied by the court. It then shows the percentage
of cases won by governments, and the percentage of cases in which proportionality was
used that were won by governments. Absolute numbers of cases are shown in brackets.
Table 2: Outcome of Rights and Security Cases from 2000 to the Present
Number of Cases
ECtHR
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Spain
All Jurisdictions

23
21
24
41
16
125

Proportionality
Applied
61% (14)
57% (12)
67% (16)
76% (31)
94% (15)
70% (88)

Government
Wins
22% (5)
43% (9)
42% (10)
68% (28)
38% (6)
46% (58)

Government Wins when
Proportionality Applied
29% (4)
50% (6)
38% (6)
58% (18)
33% (5)
44% (39)

There is significant variation between jurisdictions. For example, proportionality is applied 61
percent of the time by the ECtHR, but 94 percent of the time by Spanish courts of final
appeal. Governments have only a 22 percent chance of winning their case before the
ECtHR, but the French government wins 68 percent of domestic cases. Proportionality is
applied less often in the UK than in any other jurisdiction. Significantly, the British
Government wins 43 percent of rights versus security cases before the House of Lords –
about the same rate as Germany and higher than Spain’s. Only the French government
fares better before domestic courts. Finally, proportionality in Britain is more forgiving to the
Government than in other countries except France. The Government wins 50 percent of
proportionality cases before the House of Lords, compared to a 38 percent rate in Germany.

23

That is, the court either found no rights violation or, if there was a violation, that violation was justified.
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Although these comparisons are instructive, they must be treated with considerable caution.
The relatively small sample size means that statistical comparisons are unreliable. In
addition, differences in how domestic appellate processes work could account for variation in
win/loss records. For example, one might expect that if a court is especially willing to
entertain large numbers of challenges to legislation, a high percentage of those claims will
fail, thus resulting in a very high win/loss record for the government. If, on the other hand, a
court only heard the most difficult cases, a higher percentage – though not necessarily a
higher absolute number – of challenges to legislation would succeed. Note that although the
French Government wins 68% of post-2000 cases as compared to the German
Government’s 42%, the French and German governments lost about the same absolute
number of cases: 13 and 14 cases, respectively. Percentage comparisons, then, may
mislead. That said, absolute comparisons are also fraught with difficulties: it is not useful to
know that Spanish courts used proportionality in 15 cases since 2000 (as compared with, for
example, 16 cases in Germany) unless one also knows that those 15 Spanish cases amount
to 94% of all post-2000 Spanish cases in the study, compared with 67% of German cases.
Empirical comparisons in these circumstances are most useful as guides for further enquiry
rather than as conclusions. It is to this more detailed examination that we now turn.

3.2

The right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment

Article 3 of the ECHR states: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.’ Article 3 does not allow for limitations to the right. In
the leading case of Chahal v United Kingdom, the ECtHR explicitly confirmed that the right to
be free from torture is absolute, and that proportionality analysis in cases involving torture is
inappropriate because no restriction on the right, regardless of the reason, can ever be legal
(1997 23 EHRR 413, para 81).Provisions in national constitutions are similarly absolute:
Section 15 of the Spanish Constitution states that ‘under no circumstances’ may such
treatment be inflicted. Although the German Basic Law does not forbid this treatment
explicitly, courts have consistently held that the article 1(1) statement ‘human dignity shall be
inviolable’ forbids torture and ill treatment.

Despite the statements contained in Chahal, the ECtHR has considered questions of
proportionality in the context of Article 3 where it has been necessary to determine whether
the treatment in question constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the first place
(Labita v Italy 2000; Soering v UK 1989). Once that threshold is passed, there is no
proportionality enquiry: the right is absolute. For example, in Soering v United Kingdom a
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challenge was made to the UK government’s decision to deport a suspected murderer to
Virginia, in the United States, for trial. If convicted, Soering could have faced the death
penalty. In determining whether the death penalty in Virginia violated Article 3, the Court
mentioned that the disproportionality of the penalty to the crime could constitute a factor. It
also examined the details of the death penalty system in the United States, noting that the
long period of time between conviction and death could lead to the ‘death row phenomenon,’
which could constitute cruel treatment even though capital punishment does not itself violate
the terms of Article 3 (para. 104-09).

‘The manner in which it is imposed or executed, the personal circumstances of the
condemned person and a dis-proportionality to the gravity of the crime committed, as
well as the conditions of detention awaiting execution, are examples of factors
capable of bringing the treatment or punishment received by the condemned person
within the proscription under Article 3 (para. 104)’.

To date, courts in the UK have broadly followed the approach taken by the ECtHR in cases
involving torture and the application of Article 3. In the period covered by this report, four
cases which raised the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment were considered by the House of Lords (A (no 2) v Home Secretary 2005; N v
Home Secretary 2005; R (Limbuela) v Home Secretary 2006; R v Lichniak 2002). In each
instance the court followed the Strasbourg jurisprudence by deciding Article 3 cases without
recourse to either proportionality or balancing.24 In the cases of N and Limbuela, for example,
the House was faced with the questions whether the Government could (1) deport someone
to a country where he would be unlikely to receive lifesaving AIDS treatment and (2) deny
support services to asylum seekers who did not claim asylum according to the proper
procedures. In both cases the Lords insisted that Article 3 creates an absolute protection
entirely bereft of any considerations of proportionality (N, 307-08; Limbuela, 402-14).

Clearly, strict adherence to Article 3 has the potential to create conflicts between a
commitment to rights and the demands of security. In the UK context, such tensions arose in
the case of A (No 2) v Home Secretary, a case involving the admissibility of evidence
obtained by torture abroad. Significantly, in this instance the Lords applied both the common

24

The final Article 3 case, Lichniak, does not involve a detailed examination of the Article 3 claim. Rather, the
Lords consider Articles 3 and 5 together when judging the compatibility of the prison sentences in question.
Lichniak is essentially an Article 5 case.
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law and Article 3 and found the same result would be reached in either case: namely, that
evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible regardless of its utility.

While both the ECtHR and the UK courts look to Article 3 of the European Convention in
cases relating to torture, in Germany the protections of human dignity under Article 1(1) of
the German Basic Law provides the basis for the prohibition on inhuman treatment or torture.
Nevertheless, where torture is in question, applicants often use Article 3 of the ECHR
alongside Article 1(1) of the Basic Law. The FCC takes the strongest possible position
against torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. There is no question of applying the
proportionality test in this context, as the right is absolute. In a recent case, the FCC stopped
an extradition of a prisoner to a Californian prison where he would have been imprisoned for
life without any hope of parole (2 BvR 2259/04). The court took the view that the State could
not extradite a person where it was clear that such an extradition violated basic principles of
the German Constitution. As a consequence of the right to human dignity and the right to
personal development (Article 2(1) Basic Law), the sentence in question was viewed as both
grossly disproportionate and ‘cruel, inhuman or humiliating’, and extradition in this context
was said to constitute a violation of the ‘indispensable foundations of the German
constitutional order’ (margin 23).

The court nevertheless must be convinced that there is a real risk of a violation to human
dignity where a person is to be deported or extradited. This was not found to be the case in
a decision regarding an alleged Spanish terrorist (2 BvR 1521/03), or a Yemenite accused of
links with Al Qaida who had been tricked into Germany by the US authorities who then
applied for his extradition to the United States (2 BvR 1243/03, 1506/03). Moreover, while the
FCC strongly condemns torture, it did not view this as a basis for setting aside unrelated and
overwhelming criminal evidence that the applicant had kidnapped and murdered an eleven
year old boy. Important in this case was the fact that the lower court had already excluded
the evidence obtained under the threat of torture (2 BvR 1249/04).

The Spanish courts take a similarly stringent position on torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment. In the period covered by this report the right against torture has arisen in two
separate contexts in Spain. In STC 32/2003, the Constitutional Court considered the case of
Nejat Das, a Turkish national who claimed that if extradited to Turkey he would be tortured.
In its decision in favour of Mr. Das, the Constitutional Court first recalled the duties and
responsibilities that Spain had under the ECHR and the Convention against Torture, and
made it clear that it was obliged to ensure that an individual who faces extradition to a third
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state would not be tortured upon his arrival (para. II.3).25 In addition, it also recalled that the
right to life and to be free from torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment were
probably the most fundamental rights of every human being, and that in such contexts
proportionality analyses were simply not appropriate. The right against torture was also
invoked in a criminal trial against alleged members of ETA in STC 7/2004. Here the
appellants alleged that they were tortured while in custody and immediately prior to being
questioned by police. Accepting this allegation, the Court subsequently rejected the
evidence given in police custody, reasoning that torture rendered it both useless and
inadmissible. In any event, the Court concluded, because the conviction can rest on
evidence other than their replies, and although their rights had been violated, the sentence
was upheld.26 Again, the proportionality principle was not applied.

Based on our analysis of the above jurisdictions, it is clear that the ECtHR ,Spain, and the
British and German courts take a similar approach to the treatment of Article 3 (or similar)
claims, and are on the whole hostile to exposing such claims to any sort of proportionality
analysis. A similar approach has been taken in France, although interestingly claims based
on appeals to Article 3 have met with far less sympathy or success in the French courts.
Although the reasoning of the French courts in cases concerning Article 3 is perhaps less
readily accessible than in the European, British or German contexts – in part due to the fact
that published decisions in France are typically very brief – of the eleven cases in France in
which issues surrounding torture were raised during the period covered by this report, the
courts rejected all claims based on Article 3.27 Whereas four of the cases in question arose
out of litigation concerning the legality of deportation orders, five were concerned with the
legality of reconduites à la frontière28 and the final two related to the validity of extradition
decrees. Significantly, the government only raised issues of security, namely that the
individual had committed crimes in France, in two of these eleven cases, primarily because
reconduite à la frontière and extradition proceedings do not require the Government to argue
security in order to be successful. Feelings of insecurity and oppression in the country of
destination, being a member of a ‘victims of terrorism’ organisation in the country of
25

The Court made reference to various decisions by the ECtHR and some of its own prior judgements on this
matter. Among the most important ones, see Jabari v Turkey, GHH v Turkey, Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, Soering
and Chahal v UK; also see STC 120/1990, 13/1994, 141/1998, 147/1999 and 91/2000.
26
The Court made the following clarifying remark: although the appellants invoked on top of the constitutional
provisions, some provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR, it is not for this Court to examine whether any of these
international provisions have per se been violated. Rather its only task is to examine whether any Constitutional
right has been violated.
27
10 from the Conseil d’Etat and 1 from the Cour de cassation.
28
There are two kinds of deportations: expulsion and reconduite à la frontière. The former is taken against aliens
whose presence in France has become illegal, whereas the latter is taken against aliens who have entered
France illegally.
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destination, or the fact that other members of the family are at risk in the country of
destination were not enough to bring the claim within Article 3. All the cases failed because
the individual failed to produce evidence that he or she would run a personal, future and
realistic risk in the country of destination. Yet while the outcome in each of these cases could
be said to have favoured the government, none involved the courts in any form of
proportionality analysis, since the right to be free of torture was regarded by the courts as
having been conferred without limitations.

Looking back over the five jurisdictions, it is clear that all of them take an almost identical
position in relation to the use of the proportionality principle in cases of torture. Put simply,
the courts in each case have been clear that questions of security cannot be a basis for
limiting the rights provided under Article 3 or other prohibitions on torture, and that the right to
be free from torture is not subject to balancing exercises. Nevertheless, in both the German
and the ECHR jurisprudence, proportionality of the penalty to the crime does enter into the
equation when interpreting whether treatment constitutes torture. It is interesting to note
however that in France, despite the fact that the French courts have not subjected Article 3 to
any form of proportionality analysis, claims based on this article are rarely if ever successful.
In part, this is a result of the fact that the courts are generally unwilling to question the
evidence on which initial administrative decisions to deport or extradite individuals are made,
and as such are rarely in a position to seriously evaluate claims that such an action may lead
to a violation of Article 3. As the subsequent sections of this report will show, the approach of
the French courts in this regard has led them to be less likely to overturn administrative or
executive decisions in situations in which considerations of security and human rights are in
conflict.

3.3

The right to liberty and security

Article 5 of the ECHR protects the right to liberty and security of person. This right forbids
governments from depriving an individual of her liberty – typically, by imprisonment – except
in specific, listed circumstances such as after conviction of a crime or in order to prevent the
spread of disease (Article 5(1)(a,e)).29 The German Basic Law includes similar rights in
articles 2(2) and 104, as does section 17 of the Spanish Constitution.

29

As a consequence, if a detention does not fit one of the 5(1) categories, that detention is per se unlawful. See
Labita v Italy App. No. 26772/95.
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According to the jurisprudence developed by the ECtHR, when considering whether a
particular detention falls within the ambit of the exceptions created by Article 5(1), it is
appropriate for the Court to balance individual and state interests. Although the Court does
not make consistent use of the language of proportionality in cases involving Article 5, it is
clear from the cases that the balancing tests used in these cases closely resemble those
typically associated with the concept of proportionality. In Enhorn, for example, the Court
tested the detention of an AIDS-sufferer by asking whether the detention was a ‘last resort’
and struck a ‘fair balance’ (Enhorn v Sweden (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 30). While the Court makes
only passing mention of the need for detention to be proportionate, a close reading of the
decision reveals that the ‘last resort’ and ‘fair balance’ language used by the Court clearly
corresponds to the necessity and balance stages of proportionality review (para. 41).

In contrast to the position taken by the ECtHR, the House of Lords has used balancing,
rather than proportionality, to test restrictions on liberty. In Saadi v UK, petitioners
challenged their detention at an immigration processing facility pending the determination of
their asylum claims ([2006] App. no. 13229/03). They argued that detention violated their
Article 5 right to liberty because the detention did not fit Article 5(1)(f)’s provision for
detention in order to prevent unauthorized entry into the country. The House treated this as
a question of proportionality, although in this case the Lords applied a unique form of
proportionality review. According to Lord Slynn, proportionality here does not require that the
measure in question be necessary. Instead, proportionality requires balance between rights
and legitimate governmental aims. This is a marked difference from other formulations of
proportionality, and may stem from the fact that Article 5 does not include a limitations clause
in its text. Without the need to prove necessity, the Government won the case by arguing
that detention for a short time in good conditions was, on balance, an acceptable means of
preventing unauthorized entry into the UK.

The British House of Lords has also applied the proportionality test to the question of
whether derogations from Article 5 under the Convention are valid. This arose in A and
Others, which involved a challenge to the detention of foreign nationals under the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 ([2005] 2 AC 68). According to the Act, where an
individual could not be deported to their home countries because of the possibility of torture,
they could instead be detained by the state.30 Because such detention arguably violated
Article 5 of the Convention, the Act authorized derogation from Article 5 under the provisions
30

The Act was thus a response to the European Court of Human Rights case Chahal v the United Kingdom.
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of Article 15, the portion of the Convention that provides for derogations in times of war or
other public emergency.31 The House of Lords imposed a proportionality test on derogations
to the Convention, with Lord Bingham arguing that proportionality here involves the
traditional test used by the ECtHR.32 Applying this test the Lords concluded that the
detention without trial was not rationally connected to the goal of preventing terrorism,
particularly given that British nationals suspected of terrorist connections are not subject to
similar restrictions on their rights (para. 34-40). Crucial to this decision were the tests of
rationality and arbitrariness: if restrictions on Convention rights are irrational or arbitrary, they
are to be regarded as disproportionate per se. Critics have questioned Bingham’s application
of proportionality to derogations under Article 15 ECHR however (Ashworth in
Goold/Lazarus: page 215, footnote 51) arguing that the Article 15 requirement that
derogations are “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” is a far higher threshold
than simple proportionality.

In Germany the approach taken to the right to liberty has been considerably stricter. Unlike in
the United Kingdom, there has been no attempt to derogate from these rights in Germany
since the events of 9/11. In a recent case, a man suspected of terrorist activities linked to the
events of 9/11 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment was ordered to be released by the
Court (2 BvR 2056/05). In contrast to the balancing approach taken by the House of Lords,
on appeal against his detention the FCC found the lower court had violated the proper
procedures in question because it had not sufficiently justified its decision to allow further
detention in light of the offender’s right to personal liberty. Importantly, the court also held
the lower court’s decision unconstitutional as a milder means of dealing with the offender, in
order to satisfy the principle of proportionality, had not been examined (2 BvR 2056/05
margin no. 33 and 48). This can be contrasted with the balancing approach taken in Saadi
which avoided the ‘necessity’ part of the test in its reasoning.

Spanish courts consistently apply the proportionality test to cases involving the right to
liberty. In the period under review, at least three relevant actions of unconstitutionality were
brought before the Spanish Constitutional Court in which the right to liberty was in conflict

31

Article 15 states: ‘(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law. (2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.’
32
A and Others, Lord Bingham, para 30. Lord Bingham states the test as: ‘whether: (i) the legislative objective is
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative
objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is
necessary to accomplish the objective.’
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with security demands. The first case dealt with the detention of entry applicants at the
border, the second with the imprisonment of conscientious objectors who refuse to take on
alternatives to military service, the third with the imprisonment of drivers who refuse to take
alcohol tests. All cases were rigorously examined under the proportionality doctrine.
Nevertheless, the courts are inclined to show more deference to the legislature in such
unconstitutionality actions: "…[T]he final relationship between the magnitude of the benefits
obtained by the criminal provision and the severity of the penalty is the result of a complex
and technical analysis of criminal policy that only the legislature can carry out" (STC
161/1997). Thus, a provision could be considered to be disproportionate only "when a
manifest and excessive or unreasonable imbalance obtains between the penalty and the
purpose pursued by the law in the light of the most fundamental constitutional principles and
the actual text of the rule" (paragraph II.12,) (see also STC 48/2003 and 136/1999 infra).

The Spanish courts show less deference however in cases which do not raise questions of
the constitutionality of legislation. One of these cases is particularly relevant to this report. In
STC 14/2000, Mr. Moreno Quero was in pre-trial detention for drug trafficking and requested
parole. This petition was rejected on the grounds of the social alarm created by the offence
he allegedly had committed. The Court quashed this decision using the proportionality test. It
first argued that the aim explicitly relied upon by the Investigation Justice (pacifying the social
alarm created by an offence) was only legitimate as an aim of the actual penalty imposed,
and it could not warrant pre-trial detention. In this case the liberty on bail had been decided
exclusively on the argument that "because the investigation was in a very advanced stage,
the defendant would not be able to endanger it." Now, the Court argued, if the only
justification for pre-trial detention is to ensure the normal progress of the investigation, then
there is no risk to this aim. In stark contrast to the position that has been taken in a similar
case in the UK (Saadi), detention was not necessary, therefore it was unjustified. Unlike with
the actions of unconstitutionality, in individual appeals the Constitutional Court found in
favour of the claimants.

Turning to the situation in France, the picture is considerably less clear than in any of the
above jurisdictions. During the period covered by this report, the Cour de cassation
considered three cases dealing with Article 5 rights under the European Convention (Cass
crim 01-03-2006 Christian X; Cass crim 07-06-2006 Mohamed X; Cass crim 26-02-2003
Thierry X). In all three cases – one of which involved breaches of anti-drug legislation, and
the other two charges of murder – proceedings were brought by individuals who had been
placed under provisional custody. Significantly, in each instance the state argued that the
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restriction on the right to liberty was justified on grounds of security, and in each case the
applicant was found to be outside the scope of the right. Although all three judgments are
only briefly reported, it is clear that because the court concluded that the right to liberty could
not be invoked – and was not inclined to reconsider the facts of the case or the basis of the
government’s initial claims – balancing and proportionality were not an issue.

From this review, it is clear that all jurisdictions apply the doctrine of proportionality to the
question of whether states fall within the exceptions to the right to liberty. Nevertheless,
there is variation across jurisdictions as to the intensity of proportionality review in such
circumstances. Whereas the ECtHR and the UK House of Lords have shown a willingness to
entertain a broad brush balancing approach to the proportionality of the liberty deprivation in
question, the Spanish and German courts are more rigorous in their application of the
proportionality doctrine. The German courts have applied a strict standard of necessity –
criticizing the lower court where there has been no examination of whether a milder means
was available to achieve the end in question. Similarly, although the Spanish courts are
inclined to show more deference to the legislature where the constitutionality of penalties or
immigration measures is in question, they have shown similar vigilance to the German courts
in individual applications regarding restrictions of liberty.

3.4

Fair trial rights

Not all human rights are substantive; procedural rights are also important constraints on
government action. Listed most clearly in Article 6 of the ECHR, these rights include: the
right to counsel for criminal defendants (6(3)(c)), fair and public hearings (6(1)), and the
presumption of innocence (6(2)). Although Article 6 includes a long list of rights, the
overarching goal is to secure fair trials. The German Basic Law protects fair trial rights in a
number of provisions. For example, Article 103(1) establishes the right to a court hearing in
accordance with the law, and Article 19(4) enshrines the principle of “effective legal
protection.” In Spain, section 17(3) of the Constitution protects the rights to counsel and
silence.

The ECtHR has an extremely complicated jurisprudence regarding Article 6 rights. In part,
this reflects the fact that Article 6 protects a wide range of rights, from the broad right to a fair
trial to the narrow right to use an interpreter in court (articles 6(1) and 6(3)(e)). Sometimes,
the Court does not use proportionality at all. In many instances, the Court has held that the
right to a fair trial protected by 6(1) is absolute: if a trial is not fair, there is a violation
regardless of the reason for the limitation on the right (Teixeira de Castro v Portugal, 28
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EHRR 101; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 12 para. 58). However,
the Court has also just as frequently held that the specific procedural rights listed in Article 6
may be limited so long as the trial itself remains fair overall. In that analysis, proportionality
may come into play. In Devenney v United Kingdom, for example, the Court considered
whether an individual dismissed from his job should have the right of access to a tribunal
((2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 24). That right is normally protected by Article 6(1), but British law
precluded access where, as in Devenney, the North Ireland Secretary certified that the
dismissal was for public safety reasons. Here the ECtHR reasoned that the right of access
to a court is not absolute; it could be limited if the limitation were proportionate (para. 23, 26).
Citing a lack of oversight of the Secretary’s certification, the Court in this case found the
system to be disproportionate. In Devenney, the Court also explained that the ‘very essence
of the right’ cannot be impaired. This echoes the German concept of the essential core of a
right, but the Court did not go further and explore the idea (para. 23).

Finally, sometimes the Court does not talk about proportionality at all in the context of Article
6. Rather, it simply refers to the need to balance competing interests. This is especially
common in the context of 6(3) procedural rights and when the rights of criminal defendants
might come into conflict with rights of witnesses. For example, in Van Mechelen and Others
the Dutch government argued that police witnesses in a criminal trial should be allowed to
testify anonymously ((1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 647). Considering the case, the Court reasoned
that the rights of the defence should be balanced with the interests of the officers in
anonymity, and ultimately found anonymous testimony to be unjustified on the facts of that
case (para. 56). In Rowe and Davis v UK, the ECtHR stated that ‘[i]n any criminal
proceedings there may be competing interests, such as national security or the need to
protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime,
which must be weighed against the rights of the accused’ ((2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1).

To some extent, the position taken by the ECtHR regarding Article 6 is mirrored in the
decisions of the House of Lords, if only insofar as the House has taken a variable approach
to the question of proportionality and the appropriateness of balancing. In the case of
Anderson v Home Secretary, the House of Lords observed that Article 6 does not contain a
limitations clause, and as such the right to a fair trial must be regarded as absolute ([2003] 1
AC 837). As a result, the Lords concluded that the Home Secretary’s powers to set
sentences were inherently incompatible with the right to a fair trial under Article 6, insofar as
that right gives rise to a number of procedural protections such as the presumption of
innocence and the requirement for tribunals to be impartial. Furthermore, in the subsequent
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case of R v A (no 2), the Lords have stated that the 6(1) right to a fair trial is also inviolable
([2002] 1 AC 45, 65).

However, although the right to a fair trial is absolute, proportionality and balancing enquiries
may come into play when determining what constitutes a fair trial in the first place (R v A (no
2), Lord Steyn, at 65). Indeed, the courts have suggested that even a right as fundamental as
that against self-incrimination can be restricted under some circumstances. In Brown v Stott,
the Privy Council held that legislation requiring individuals to state who had been driving an
automobile that was involved in an accident was compatible with the Convention despite the
fact that it was a form of self-incrimination ([2003] 1 AC 681). Although the Convention
protects the rights of criminal defendants,

“the [ECHR] has also recognised the need for a fair balance between the general
interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, the search for
which balance has been described as inherent in the whole of the Convention” (Lord
Bingham at 704).

The most common Government justification for restricting Article 6 rights is that some
restrictions are necessary in order to punish certain types of crimes. This argument is
sometimes successful, as with self-incrimination in Brown v Stott and reverse burdens of
proof in Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 A.C. 264. However, the Lords have typically tested these
restrictions using the concepts of proportionality and balance, and have shown themselves
willing to reinterpret or declare legislation incompatible if necessary. Sheldrake involved two
cases in which the relevant legislation imposed a burden of proof on the defendant: the first
was drink-driving, the second was the crime of belonging to a terrorist organization. In this
instance, the Lords imposed what they called a proportionality test. However, this test was
broad and multifactor and lacked the rigorous multi-stage process seen in other Convention
jurisprudence. In short, the Lords actually used balancing, not proportionality. In the end, the
House “read down” provisions of the anti-terrorism statute in Sheldrake. Despite the very
real threat of terrorism, they concluded that while “security considerations must always carry
weight, they do not absolve member states from their duty to ensure that basic standards of
fairness are observed” (Lord Bingham at 313). The Lords reasoned that even the need to
prosecute members of terrorist organizations was not sufficient to outweigh the presumption
of innocence.33
33

See also R v Loosely, [2001] 1 WLR 2060, holding that entrapment was an unacceptable abuse of process
under the common law, not to mention the Convention.
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A similar blurring of balancing and proportionality is to be found in Spain. In STC 127/2000,
immediately following the arrest of an individual for crimes related to the terrorist group ETA,
the investigating judge ordered that he be held incommunicado under the applicable statutes.
Two days later the suspect was taken before the judge and interrogated. On hearing the
eventual appeal against the detention, the Spanish Constitutional Court acknowledged that
being held incommunicado constitutes a limitation to the right to legal counsel provided for in
Article 17(3) of the Spanish Constitution, which guarantees the right to designate an attorney
one trusts and the right to have a private interview prior to any interrogation. In this case the
Court concentrated on the proportionality stricto sensu test, and applied what was in essence
a balancing test. The Court held that the restriction of individual rights was justified in this
case by the protection of social peace and public security.

This blurring between tests of proportionality and exercises in balancing in the European,
Spanish and UK contexts is not, however, to be found in Germany. The German Constitution
contains a number of provisions that approximate Article 6 of the Convention. Article 103(1)
establishes the right to a court hearing in accordance with the law (recht auf Rechtliches
gehör). Article 19(4) of the Basic Law enshrines the principle of ‘effective legal protection’
(Effektives Rechtschutz) where any right (legal or constitutional) has been violated by a
public authority. This relates in particular to matters of public law and criminal procedure.
Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed principles approximating the right
to a fair trial from Article 20 of the Basic Law which entrenches the Rechtstaatsprinzip. In
particular the FCC has argued that the ‘presumption of innocence’ (Vermutung der
Schuldlosigkeit) is a fundamental constitutional principle which incorporates a variety of
procedural protections (BVerfGE 19 342, 347). The FCC refers also to the European
Convention (Article 6 ECHR) as a part of German positive law.

The leading FCC case in relation to fair trial procedures concerns an Imam of Turkish
nationality who was threatened with immediate deportation after a translation of a speech
was broadcast on television (2 BvR 485/05). The authorities took the speech to be an
incitement to terrorism and an insult to Germany. The applicant, who argued that the speech
had been misinterpreted in the broadcast, applied for interim legal protection against the
deportation order which the Berlin administrative court declined on the grounds that the
security of the Federal Republic of Germany was in danger. The applicant claimed inter alia
a violation of his right to effective legal protection (Article 19(4) Basic Law) and the right to a
hearing in court (Article 103(1) Basic Law). The FCC found that the applicant’s right to
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effective legal protection had been violated by the lower court, because the court did not
have sufficient evidence to justify its assertion that the claimant was a threat to security. For
a grave measure such as the immediate deportation of the applicant to be allowed, there
needed to be more than mere assertion or suspicion (bloße Vermutungen) of a security risk.
Concrete factors justifying the danger in question are required.

A second exemplary case involved German legislation implementing the ‘European Arrest
Warrant’ (2 BvR 2236/04). The warrant can be used against German citizens and as a
consequence was a direct invasion of Article 16(2) of the Basic Law which stipulates that no
German citizen may be extradited to another country. The case struck down the legislation
on two grounds. Firstly the legislation governing the ‘European arrest warrant’ was struck
down because it was disproportionate and infringed upon the ‘core’ of the right against
extradition. Secondly, the approval procedure for the warrants involved a discretionary
balancing decision which was insufficiently defined in order to allow for proper judicial
supervision and therefore constituted a violation of the right to effective legal protection under
Article 19(4) of the Basic Law (margin 111-115).

What is clear from these cases is that although the FCC considers the proportionality
analysis to be relevant to aspects of the general right to a fair trial, its application of that
analysis has been strict. Unlike the ECtHR and the UK courts, the FCC frequently returns to
the important idea of the ‘core of the right’ when determining whether Articles 19, 20, or 103
(1) of the Basic Law have been violated. The FCC is particularly critical where the grounds
for the limitation of fair trial rights are based on generalised assertions relating to security
threats, or where trial procedures themselves involve an unacceptably broad discretionary
balancing exercise.

In stark contrast, and to some extent mirroring their approach taken in relation to Article 5
rights, the French courts almost never consider questions of proportionality in cases in which
the right to a fair trial under Article 6 has been invoked. This is not, however, because of
some principled hostility to the idea of proportionality, but rather a function of the fact that it is
extremely rare for French courts to look behind the reasoning of any state decision which
might impinge upon the right. In the period considered by this report, only three French cases
referred to Article 6 of the Convention, two from the Cour de cassation and one from the
Conseil d’Etat. Only the last of these made any explicit mention of the right to a fair trial, and
in this case the Cour de cassation reasoned – somewhat opaquely – that the individual’s fair
trial rights had prima facie not been restricted. As a consequence, it followed that no
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proportionality enquiry was necessary. As with many of the other rights considered in this
report, it is clear that the reticence of the higher French courts to look behind the decisions of
state officials has the effect of circumventing any potential argument about proportionality,
and of leaving many government decisions untouched.

As observed in the case of Article 5, it is clear that Article 6 rights – despite the fact that such
rights under the Convention are said to be absolute – are subjected to proportionality review
in many jurisdictions. Having said this, based on the cases reviewed for the purposes of this
report, there is some evidence to suggest that in the wake of the events of 9/11 the courts –
with the exception of the German FCC – are in fact willing to subject such rights to balancing
exercises, albeit while retaining the language of proportionality.

3.5

Privacy rights

Article 8 of the ECHR protects individuals’ right to private life and correspondence. Under
the ECHR, this right can be limited, but only in accordance with law and so far as is
“necessary in a democratic society” (8(2)). Among other effects, the right to privacy
constrains governments’ abilities to conduct surveillance and release information about
individuals to the public. In Germany, Article 10 of the Basic Law protects the privacy of
correspondence, and Article 13 Basic Law protects the privacy of the home. German courts
also recognize a right to informational self-determination (Census Case ,BVerfGE 65, 1, 43)
under the right to personal development (Article 2 Basic Law). Section 18 of the Spanish
Constitution protects rights to honour, personal and family privacy, secrecy of
communications, and other privacy-associated rights.

Only two ECtHR cases in this study involved a conflict between the right to privacy and
security. In Klass and Others v Germany ((1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 214)34 the Court examined
German legislation that allowed surveillance without a requirement that the observed
individuals ever be informed that their communications had been monitored. In this case, the
Court held that although Article 8(1) rights were limited, these limitations were justified under
8(2). The Court applied a “strict necessity” test and sought “balance” but, interestingly, never
mentioned the word “proportionality” (para. 42, 59).35 In Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden, the
ECtHR again faced the question of whether rights to privacy could be limited in order to

34

Labita v Italy App. No. 26772/95 and Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 45 also deal with privacy, but
in each the Court held that article 8 was violated because the restriction on privacy was not according to law.
Proportionality did not enter into the analysis.
35
Note that this case is much older than most others in this study: decided in 1978, it may precede the language
of proportionality in Strasbourg jurisprudence.
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protect security. The Court found against Sweden, reasoning that the restrictions were not
proportionate. In Segerstedt-Wiberg, the Court again applied a “strict necessity test” (para
88), but also required that any restrictions be proportionate.

In the United Kingdom, tests of proportionality have been used by courts considering Article
8 privacy issues but the test is not consistently applied. The highwater mark of proportionality
in the UK is the case of R (Daly) v Home Secretary ([2001] 2 AC 532). Here, the House of
Lords applied a rigorous proportionality test (p. 547). Furthermore, Lord Steyn’s explanation
of the difference between proportionality and Wednesbury reasonableness in Daly has
become the touchstone of all future proportionality analysis in British human rights cases.36 It
is perhaps ironic that subsequent privacy cases before the House of Lords have not been
dealt with in such a rigorous way. In both Marper ([2004] 1 WLR 2196) and Gillan ([2006] 2
WLR 537), the Lords judged restrictions on privacy according to a proportionality standard
that can best be described as perfunctory. Ignoring the analysis of Daly, although the Lords
claimed to be analyzing proportionality, they were actually performing a balancing exercise.
In both cases, the Lords found the restrictions at issue to be justified with little discussion
(Marper, p. 2212-13; Gillan, p. 344).

In Germany, the FCC uses proportionality stringently to protect privacy rights, in particular
the right to informational self-determination. This was evident in the ‘Rasterfahndung’ case
decided in 2006 which dealt with the police’s search through personal data stored for noncriminal purposes (e.g. University registration details) in order to find potential terrorists after
9/11 (1 BvR 518/02). In their search the police applied the following search criteria: male,
age between 18 and 40, students past and present, Islamic religion, country of birth. A
Moroccan applicant of Islamic faith challenged the general search on the grounds that it
violated his right to informational self-determination. The FCC conducted an extensive
proportionality analysis of the policy in question. It concluded that the search policy pursued
a legitimate constitutional purpose, that it was suited to that purpose and necessary in the
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Lord Steyn compared human rights proportionality analysis with the older Wednesbury standard: ‘there is an
overlap between the traditional grounds of review and the approach of proportionality. Most cases would be
decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted. But the intensity of review is somewhat greater under
the proportionality approach... First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the
balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable
decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it
may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even
the heightened scrutiny test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith is not necessarily appropriate to the
protection of human rights... In other words, the intensity of the review, in similar cases, is guaranteed by the twin
requirements that the limitation of the right was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a
pressing social need, and the question whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim
being pursued’ (p. 547-548).
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sense that no milder measure could be found to fulfil that purpose. Nevertheless, the FCC
found the search for such information in the absence of a ‘concrete danger’ justified by
identifiable indicators/concrete facts (konkrete Tatsachen) to be disproportionate in the
narrow sense. The court concluded that the ‘general threat which existed after the attacks of
9/11’ and the general global threat of terrorism was insufficient to justify such a grave
infringement of the right to informational self-determination. The FCC concluded that the
policy did not strike the proper balance between the pursuit of security and the protection of
the individual’s right to informational self-determination.

The FCC also found that the core of privacy was violated by a number of provisions in the
Criminal Procedure Code (the so-called Grosse Lauschangriff) which allowed for acoustic
surveillance of houses in pursuit of the prevention of crime (1 BvR 2378/98). Here the Court
laid much weight on the protection of human dignity as a constraint on the potential
limitations under Article 13(3) Basic Law which allows for limitations in pursuit of public safety
and order to the right to the privacy of the home. The potential for infringement of human
dignity meant that acoustic surveillance had to be limited to conversations about criminal
activity, but had to be broken off where the conversations ranged into personal territory.
Certainly recordings of any such personal conversations would have to be destroyed. It was
not appropriate, according to the FCC, to employ a proportionality analysis where measures
touched on “the core of privacy” and thereby the right to human dignity. Where
proportionality strictu sensu could apply to surveillance measures, the FCC reiterated the
requirement that measures allowing for surveillance on the basis of suspicion of criminal
activity had to be justified by reference to concrete facts.

In Spain, the most common use of proportionality principles in relation to privacy-related
rights has been in the context of conflicts between the right to privacy and the public interest
in combating crime - in particular, organized crime. In such cases, discussion in the Spanish
Constitutional Court focuses on the issue of whether there were enough reasons to order the
interception and whether the judge, who is the only authority entitled to do so, was properly
motivated in her decision. However, convictions are rarely overturned on grounds of
violations of the right to privacy. Because the Court reasons that all the evidence that was
gathered irrespectively of the interceptions is not affected by the violation of the right to
privacy, convictions are often upheld.

The right to privacy does arise however in respect to the right to one’s image under Article
18.1 of the Spanish Constitution. In STC 14/2003, the Court held that a murder suspect,
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Vergara, whose picture had been taken and broadly distributed to the media had had his
right to his personal image violated. This right cannot be said to be unconditioned or
absolute, but is limited by other rights and constitutional goods, including the collective
interest in security. In order to assess whether this right should be restricted in this case the
Court used a three-stage proportionality test. The Court focused its analysis on the
necessity of the restriction. The Court reasoned that security and crime control did not
require the distribution of Vergara’s picture at all. Other means were available for pursuing
criminal suspects; for that reason, their privacy rights had been violated (para. II.11).

Privacy rights in Spain have also affected communications by prisoners. In STC 169/2003,
the petitioner sent a letter to a fellow prison inmate in which he addressed some of the prison
personnel as lazy. This letter was intercepted and he was sanctioned. This interception was
carried out in accordance with an internal decision by the Director of that prison which stated
that, given that the communication between prisoners in the same premises were not
covered by the Penitentiary Regulations, they would all be intercepted. The state lawyer
defended the interception and the sanction in this particular case arguing that the security of
a prison also covers the respect owed to its guards and other prisoners (para. I.10.a). The
Court adopted a different view. First, it claimed that, under Article 53.1 of the Spanish
Constitution, a general restriction upon a fundamental right could only be established in a
legal provision and not by a decision of an administrative authority such as a prison director
(para. II.3). Secondly, it argued that the measure of intercepting all communications between
interns was disproportionate for not being explicitly justified under the particular
circumstances of a case, for affecting all the interns indiscriminately, and even all future
interns (paragraph II.4).

As in Germany and Spain proportionality review has also played a role – albeit a more limited
one – in the French courts. During the period under consideration, one case dealing with the
right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention was decided by the Cour de
cassation, and dealt specifically with the use of telecommunication recordings as evidence
used in a prosecution for drug trafficking. Unusually for France, here the Government argued
for a restriction on the right on grounds of security, and claimed that the measure was taken
in order to verify whether the applicant was involved in international drug traffic and to protect
public health (Cass crim 07-12-2005, William X et Autre). In this instance, the court found
that the measures were acceptable under the Article 8 scheme, primarily because the
surveillance “was placed under the supervision of a judge, it corresponded to a legitimate
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end, it was proportionate to the gravity of crimes already committed and being in course of
commission… and it was strictly limited to the necessities of verifying the truth.” Given that in
the early 1980s the ECtHR had repeatedly found France to be in breach of the right to
private life in similar cases, the fact that the surveillance was placed under “effective judicial
control” clearly played a major role in finding against the applicants. For the purposes of this
report, however, the case is significant because it represents one of the few instances in
which a French court has explicitly engaged in a consideration of proportionality principles,
and has evaluated the legitimacy of a government decision on that basis.

Overall, it can be said that proportionality has played a decisive role in protecting the privacy
related rights of applicants in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, France. The ECtHR
also sometimes uses proportionality, coupled with (and, in the case of Klass, supplanted by)
a strict necessity requirement. The proportionality doctrine has not however been as
consistently and rigorously applied in the UK, with the stringency of the Daly requirements
being watered down in subsequent case law which took a broader balancing approach.

3.6

The right to family life

Article 8 of the Convention also protects the right to family life. Like the right to privacy, the
Convention provides that this right can be limited in accordance with law as necessary in a
democratic society. The right to family life is most often claimed by individuals facing
deportation. These individuals argue that because they have family members in the
deporting country, deportation would violate their Article 8 rights. Section 18 of the Spanish
Constitution protects the right to family privacy, and Article 6(1) of the German Basic Law
states that “marriage and the family shall enjoy special protection by the state.”

Almost one fifth of the cases considered by the ECtHR in this area involved a conflict
between the Article 8 right to family life and states’ alleged need to deport individuals
deemed a threat to security. This is the most common type of rights versus security case
handled by the Court. These cases almost invariably involve a state attempting to deport or
refuse residence to an immigrant who has been convicted of crimes. The immigrant typically
has family in the country of residence and argues that deportation would limit his Article 8
right to family life. Limitations on 8(1) rights in this context present the most straightforward
and consistent application of proportionality used by the ECtHR. Proportionality here is a
two-step process: (i) there must be a ‘pressing social need’ and (ii) the limitations on the right
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued (Uner v the Netherlands [2005] 3
F.C.R. 111, para. 54-57).
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Proportionality in the family life / deportation context is necessarily a multifactor enquiry. The
Court examines the applicants’ (and their families’) connections to their state of residence
and the receiving state as well as the severity of the crimes committed. On balance, the
ECtHR tends to find for applicants.37 The following language from Boultif v Switzerland is
typical ((2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 50):

“[T]he applicant has been subjected to a serious impediment to establishing a family
life, since it is practically impossible for him to live his family life outside Switzerland.
On the other hand, when the Swiss authorities decided to refuse permission for the
applicant to stay in Switzerland, he presented only a comparatively limited danger to
public order. The Court is therefore of the opinion that the interference was not
proportionate to the aim pursued” (para. 55).
Although there have been no comparable Article 8 cases in the UK38, Germany, or Spain during
the time frame considered by this report, in France some 71 cases referring to the right to family
life under the European Convention have come before the Cour de cassation and the Conseil
d’Etat. Of the six relevant Cour de cassation cases examined, all concern bans from French
territory, which is a penalty that French criminal courts can impose on aliens who have been
convicted for crimes of certain gravity. The remaining 65 Conseil d’Etat cases dealt primarily
with deportations and reconduites à la frontière, as well as with refusals of residence permits
and visas, residence restrictions and electronic collection of data concerning immigrants.

The French Government did not argue security in 10 cases. In those 60 cases where security
was raised, the argument was based on the criminal behaviour of the individual, including
crimes against life, bodily integrity and property, rape, possession and use of weapons, drug
traffic, assault, falsification of documents, support of terrorism, terrorism and exploitation of
prostitution. In one case the security argument took the form of a foreign diplomat who was
classified as persona non grata.

From a consideration of these cases, it is clear that the French courts tend to interpret Article
8 in such a way that the Government will win if it can prove some kind of public interest in
removing or excluding the individual from France. That is, Article 8 claims to the right to
37

Indeed, it did so in all cases but Uner.
None, that is, before the House of Lords. See R v Carmona [2006] EWCA Crim 508 for a Court of Appeals
case.
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family life will fail unless the individual can prove an accumulation of the majority of the
following factors: that he or she has lived in France for a long time (usually since his or her
adolescence); that his or her family also resides in France; that some members of the family
are French nationals; that he or she cannot speak the language of the country of destination
and that they have no family ties in their country of origin. Interestingly for France,
proportionality appears in the majority of cases. Even in the cases where it does not appear
expressis verbis, the control for manifest error of appreciation conducted by the court
contains proportionality considerations which do not appear on the face of the judgment. In
the deportation, visa, residence permit, residence restrictions and ban from French territory
contexts, the courts balance all the aforementioned factors that may link the individual with
France with the goals of public interest pursued by the measure in question.

To conclude as regards the right to family life, it is difficult to make strong comparative
statements without any case examples from the UK, Spain or Germany. Nevertheless, what
the French and ECtHR cases demonstrate is that family life cases, perhaps more than any
other human right, are determined predominantly by the application of proportionality strictu
sensu, rather than by questions of the legitimacy and necessity of the rights limiting
measures cited by states. In applying the narrow proportionality test both the ECtHR and the
French courts adopt a broad multi-factor enquiry into whether the measure in question strikes
a proper balance between security on the one hand, and the rights of the individual on the
other.

3.7

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. This right includes the
“freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority” (10(1)). Under the ECHR, freedom of expression may be
limited in accordance with law as necessary in a democratic society (10(2)). According to
Article 5 of the German Basic Law, all citizens have “the right freely to express and
disseminate their opinions orally, in writing or visually and to obtain information from
generally accessible sources without hindrance.” In Spain, section 20 of the Constitution
protects a list of rights, including expression, communication, and even academic freedom.
Like the ECHR, the Spanish and German provisions on freedom of expression are subject to
express limitations.

Including, as it does, the classic limitations clause under Article 10(2), freedom of expression
cases under the Convention might be expected to turn on a clear and consistent
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proportionality test. This is not always the case. Sometimes, the Court does engage in the
proportionality test it uses for other Convention rights (Incal v Turkey (2000) 29 E.H.R.R.
449). Other times, the Court appears to follow the proportionality test in form but not in the
substance of its reasoning. In Erdogdu v Turkey, for example, the Court claimed to be
applying the principle of proportionality, but actually decided the case using an American
style “bright-line” test: if the speech in question incited violence, it could be restricted; if it did
not, no restriction was possible ((2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 50). The ECtHR found that the speech
did not incite violence, so Turkey’s restrictions violated the Convention (para. 60). Clearly,
this sort of line drawing cannot be meaningfully referred to as a proportionality analysis, and
runs counter to the approach adopted by the Court in relation to many of the other
Convention rights examined in this report.

In the United Kingdom, freedom of expression has only rarely been the subject of human
rights cases before the House of Lords. Two cases included in this study involve Article 10
expression claims: R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police and R v Shayler. In Gillan, the Lords
held that the right to freedom of expression was not triggered because the circumstances of
the case did not demonstrate any limitation of that right (p. 345). The Lords’ jurisprudence on
Article 10 rights to expression thus depends on their analyses in Shayler. Shayler involved
the question of whether the Official Secrets Act was compatible with the right to freedom of
expression if it did not include a public interest defence being available to those prosecuted
for releasing classified information in breach of the Act. Shayler argued that lack of such a
defence violated Article 10; the Government, meanwhile, argued that secrecy was necessary
in order to protect national security.

The Lords reasoned that although the Official Secrets Act did limit Article 10 rights, those
limitations were justified under the limitations clause contained in 10(2).

Following Lord

Steyn’s analysis in Daly, the House adopted a 3-stage proportionality test for freedom of
expression cases. Proportionality requires (1) a sufficiently important objective, (2) a rational
connection to that objective, and (3) a no more than necessary limitation on the right (Lords
Bingham at 272 (quoting Lord Steyn in Daly) and Hope at 281). The Lords reasoned that
considering the internal security service procedures available for releasing classified
information, the restrictions on expression were proportionate to the goal of protecting
national security.

If one focused only on the doctrine of proportionality, Shayler would appear to be a relatively
simple case. However, Lord Hope’s comment about deference suggests that the Lords
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intend, in line with section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act, to afford a higher level of
protection to expression than to other Convention rights. Lord Hope “would place the onus
firmly on those who seek to rely on Article 10(2) [of the Convention] to show that sections
1(1) and 4(1) [of the Secrets Act] are compatible with the Convention right” (p. 277).
Although Lord Hope later acknowledges a “wide margin of discretion” for the Government in
matters of national security, it appears that he sees little room for deference in the
expression context (p. 287).

The German FCC is broadly sympathetic to security arguments in free speech cases –
particularly when terrorism is involved. Based on an analysis of the cases examined for this
report, it is clear that the FCC is prepared restrict speech when it threatens state security.
For example, the Kurdistan-Kommittee case involved an organisation which sympathised
with certain terrorist activities/groups. The Kommittee was outlawed by the Federal
Administrative Court. The organisation appealed to the FCC, which took the view that the
Federal Administrative Court was right in judging that the activities and political support of the
Kurdistan-Kommitee were a threat to national security (margin 41). The determination that
the Kommitee was a danger to public security was a reasonable use of constitutional law and
facts (margin 43). The FCC found that the right to freedom of expression had not been
violated as the measure was not disproportionate (margin 18). Uncharacteristically, the FCC
did not engage in a detailed analysis of proportionality in this case; it merely stated that the
restrictions were proportionate (1 BvR 1539/94). Two other cases in our selection involved
similar restrictions on supposedly pro-terrorist speech (1 BvR 289/00 from 15/11/2001 and 1
BvR 77/96 from 22/08/2000). In each, the FCC found that limits on speech were
proportionate responses to threats to national security.

However, the government does not win all German speech cases. In 1 BvR 1072/01, the
claimant was the editor and producer of a magazine called "Junge Freiheit" which had
published a right wing article. The magazine had been listed as being right wing extremist in
a report on the protection of the constitution. The editor complained about an infringement of
the right to freedom of press. The FCC took the view that the mere criticism of constitutional
values is not a danger to the free democratic basic order, but activities going beyond that to
dispose of it would be such a threat (margin 70). The FCC argued that, “in order to infringe
the right of freedom of press (by tainting a magazine's image by classifying it as extreme
right-wing) you need sufficiently concrete points for suspicion” (the intensity must be strong
enough to justify infringement) (margin 67-68). Moreover, the Court argued that you need to
find expressions which go beyond mere criticism and you need to prove that articles written
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by third parties reflect the view of the production team (margin 70, 76). The FCC reasoned
that for a magazine to be a “market of opinions” the magazine may reflect a certain portion of
the political spectrum but must give freedom within that range of ideas, and need not identify
with each individual publication. As a general principle, the FCC reasoned that where there is
a weighty measure at stake, the demands of proportionality are in each case influenced by
the significance of the legal value that is to be protected and by its level of endangerment,
but also by the infringement of the right of freedom of the affected (margin 66).

The picture on freedom of expression is equally mixed in Spain. In STC 11/2006, three
issues of a magazine linked to ETA were seized by government authorities and not delivered
to an ETA prisoner. He complained on grounds of a violation to his right to freedom of
information provided for in the Spanish Constitution (Article 20.1) as well as relevant
provisions in Spanish Prison Law. Although the Court applied the proportionality test, it
reasoned that the measure was adequate, given that withholding a magazine that could
create a security threat within the prison was an adequate means of preventing the threat.
Furthermore, it was argued that the measure was necessary, as the only alternatives were
either the claimant got the magazine, or he did not. Finally, the court concluded that the
measures in question were proportionate stricto sensu to the aim of protecting the security
and order of the prison and reforming the offender.

This decision can be contrasted, however, with STC 136/1999 – where 22 members of the
national direction of Herri Batasuna were sentenced to seven years imprisonment and a fine
for collaborating with ETA. The acts of collaboration had been to "recognize" the content of a
videotape submitted by ETA during an election campaign and distributing that content in
various ways. The Court applied the proportionality test and concluded that the restriction on
the rights of freedom of expression and liberty amounted to a constitutionally legitimate aim,
and was both adequate and even necessary.39 However, in this instance it found that the
measures were disproportionate stricto sensu. Given the severity and effects on the
exercise of the rights of freedom of expression and information, this criminal provision was
not proportionate to the gravity of the acts that were being punished. The reasons for this
were: first, that the acts were not able by themselves to create any risk; second, that the
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The necessity of this provision was defended on the following grounds: a) what was being sanctioned was an
illegitimate use of the rights to freedom of expression and information and, therefore, its protection was less strict;
b) the acts that were being punished were that of aiding an armed band responsible for terrorist acts. Thus, given
the importance of the goods that are being protected, it could not be said that the criminal sanction was
unnecessary given that other measures (such as simply prohibiting the broadcasting of these videotapes and
tapes) would have had a similar effect (with less costs) (paragraph. II.28).
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penalty provided in abstract was too severe40; and thirdly, that this criminal rule applied to the
expression of ideas and information by members of a legitimate political association in the
middle of an electoral period and directed to request votes. With reference to the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Court argued that special moderation was required when
sanctioning activities related to the rights to freedom of expression and information. Finally,
the Court claimed that the deterrent effects of these provisions could have negative
consequences over the political process itself (because the prohibition was so vague). While
the Court recognized that the legislature has competence to decide what measures will
protect the public, it insisted that it had a duty to make sure that the criminal provision under
analysis did not imply a pointless use of coercion that would make the rule arbitrary, and that
this rule did not undermine basic fundamental rights or the rule of law (para. II.23).

In France, there is only one Cour de cassation case dealing with Article 10 of the ECHR
(Cass crim 30-10-2006). This case dealt with a measure taken by the police to obtain a list
of telephone calls from some journalists in order to identify a police officer who was leaking
information concerning an on-going investigation to the press. In this case, the court took the
view that the journalists in question were not obliged to reveal their sources, and that this
brought the case within the scope of Article 10. The Government argued security as a
limitation to the right, namely that the measure was justified by both public interest
imperatives of protecting others, e.g. the presumption of innocence, and the keeping of
confidential information as well as by the necessity to guard against behaviours tending to
hinder the finding of the truth. In a decision which turned on a proportionality analysis of the
government’s actions, the court found that the measure was “necessary for the investigation
of a crime and proportionate to the aim it pursues.”

Overall, these cases suggest that, with the exception of some decisions of the ECtHR, courts
in all of the jurisdictions apply the proportionality analysis most rigorously with respect to
freedom of speech. Moreover, given the general respect for freedom of expression, courts
are less inclined to develop a strong doctrine of deference or evaluative leeway in this
context. Notwithstanding, courts in all jurisdictions are also broadly sympathetic to the
state’s need to restrict Article 10 (or related rights) where potential or actual terrorist activity
is involved. As a consequence, the picture on freedom of expression is mixed, with no one
jurisdiction standing out in this regard. Nevertheless, of all the cases in our selection, the two
most critical of overly oppressive state intervention are Spain and Germany.
40

The Court compared it with other relevant provisions in Germany, Austria, the UK and Italy and found that the
Spanish sanctions were far more severe.
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3.8

Freedom of association

Freedoms of association and assembly are protected by Article 11 of the Convention. These
freedoms, particularly when taken together with the freedom of expression, protect, among
other things, the right of individuals to come together to form political parties (United
Communist Party v Turkey, 1998). As with expression, these Convention freedoms can be
limited in accordance with law as necessary in a democratic society. Articles 8 and 9 of the
German Basic Law protect the right to assemble and form peaceful associations; as do
sections 21 and 22 of the Spanish Constitution. Both constitutions include express limitations
on the right to freedom of assembly and association. In Germany, the right to association
includes an express exception under Article 9(2) Basic Law which states: “Associations, the
objects or activities of which conflict with the criminal laws or which are directed against the
constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, are prohibited.”

The right to freedom of association contained in Article 11 of the European Convention is
limited under Article 11(2) which contains the classic Convention limitations clause, once
again inviting the Court to use a proportionality test. However, the ECtHR has instead
developed a unique version of proportionality in this context. When political association is
involved, the Court requires “convincing and compelling reasons” for any limitation on the
right, a much stronger standard of review than is typical for proportionality (Gorzelik and
Others v Poland (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 4). Furthermore, the 11(2) limitations clause is to be
construed strictly. Add in only a “limited” margin of appreciation and the Court leaves little
room for states to restrict association.

The ECtHR explored Article 11 most fully in a trio of Turkish cases (United Communist Party
of Turkey v Turkey (1998), Socialist Party of Turkey v Turkey (1999), Refah Partisi (Welfare
Party) v Turkey (2003). In the span of a few years, the Turkish Supreme Court dissolved
Communist, Socialist, and Islamist parties; each party argued that their dissolution violated
Article 11. The ECtHR held that the dissolution of the Communist and Socialist parties
violated Article 11. However, Refah Partisi – an Islamist party and the most popular party in
Turkey – could be dissolved. The key, for the Court, was the Convention language of
“necessary in a democratic society.” The Court focused on the concept of democracy and
argued that if a party was a threat to democracy, it could be restricted in order to protect the
democratic system itself. The Court explained, “the Court points out that it has previously
held that some compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society and
individual rights is inherent in the Convention system” (Refah, para. 94).
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Article 11 rights and freedom of association do not play a significant role in the British cases
included in this study. Out of the cases identified, only one, R (Laporte) v Chief Constable,
squarely addresses the issue of freedom of association ([2006] UKHL 55). In Laporte, police
turned away a bus full of protestors because the police suspected some of the individuals on
the bus of intending to cause a breach of the peace. The Lords found the action both
unlawful – because no law provided for the indiscriminate police action absent imminent
threat – and in violation of the ECHR, because the action was a disproportionate restriction
on the Article 11 right to freedom of assembly (para. 56, per Lord Bingham). The Lords
focused on the requirement of necessity, and reasoned that the extreme measures taken
were unnecessary, and thus disproportionate, to any governmental interest in preventing
disorder (para. 85, per Lord Rodger).

As regards Germany, the most important association case involves the Kurdistan-Kommitee,
discussed in the expression section above. As was the case in relation to freedom of
expression, the FCC found that there was no violation of the freedom of association (1 BvR
1539/94). The Court’s examination of proportionality here was cursory.

None of the French cases in this study raised the right to association.

Finally, there is only one relevant Spanish case on freedom of association that falls within the
ambit of this report. In STC 48/2003, the Basque Government argued that laws regulating the
legality of political parties were incompatible with the rights of freedom of association,
ideological freedom, and freedom of expression provided in the Spanish Constitution. The
Constitutional Court dismissed this claim reasoning that the restriction on rights satisfied the
proportionality test. The Court reasoned, first, that the law did not in itself entail the
dissolution of a party. Rather, for dissolution to occur, proscribed acts had to be carried out
repeatedly and be of considerable gravity. Secondly, the existence of a political party that
contributed or supported terrorism endangered the subsistence of the plural order provided
for in the Spanish Constitution. Thus, the Court affirmed that in such cases there seemed to
be no other option than dissolution. Finally, the Court stated that for a political party to
deserve being recognized as such under the Constitution, the party had to itself recognize
the doctrine of political pluralism.

From our analysis of the cases, it appears that the ECtHR has the most stringent
proportionality requirements with respect to freedom of association relative to the other
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jurisdictions in this selection. However, it is difficult on the sample available to draw very
clear comparative conclusions. In Britain, the Laporte case demonstrates relatively high
regard for the right to freedom of association. However, while proportionality as necessity
was applied in Laporte, this analysis was secondary to the question of legality in this case.
Until the House of Lords decides further cases on the issue it remains to be seen just what
sort of security justification it will take to limit the right to association in the UK. The one
German case example appears uncharacteristic for its absence of detailed reasoning
regarding proportionality, although this may be linked to the strong exception clause
contained in Article 9(2) Basic Law which expressly prohibits groups which threaten the
criminal law or the constitutional order. There is no French case example. While the
Spanish case example shows a rigorous application of the proportionality doctrine, it also
demonstrates that some security threats are considered significant enough to allow
restrictions on even political association. In all cases where the restriction on the right to
association was upheld, the organisations in question were characterised by the courts as
posing a threat to the basic democratic values of the State.
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Part 4

Conclusions

This report is only a first step: the conflict between rights and security is inherently fraught
and complex, shaped by multiple and frequently conflicting legal principles, constitutional
concerns, and competing goals. Comparisons between jurisdictions increase the complexity
and should prove a ripe subject for further scholarship. For these reasons, our conclusions
are necessarily preliminary.

Yet some things are clear. First, British courts are not being overwhelmed with rights versus
security cases. Since the Human Rights Act came into force in 2000, only twenty-one cases
involving a conflict between rights and security have been decided by the House of Lords.
With the exception of France, the other jurisdictions included in this study had a similar
number of cases. The British Government’s success in these rights versus security cases
does not vary substantially from other European jurisdictions. Since 2000, the British
Government won domestic cases at about the same rate as the German Government, and
lower only than France in proportional terms.41 On this basis, it can be argued that the
perception that the British government’s security policies are more restricted by human rights
considerations than in other comparable European jurisdictions is open to question.

Second, proportionality plays a crucial role in deciding rights versus security cases.
Proportionality criteria were applied by courts in 70 percent of the cases in our selection. In
the remaining cases proportionality was typically not applied either because the right in
question is seen as absolute, such as with torture, or because the court chooses to simply
balance interests rather than use, or mention, proportionality. However, there is significant
variation between jurisdictions as to the consistency with which proportionality is applied.

Third, there is no single formulation of the proportionality principle. Courts across
jurisdictions vary considerably in the level of scrutiny they apply to government assertions
through the proportionality lens. In Germany and Spain, proportionality almost always
involves a rigorous four-stage enquiry. However, the picture is less consistent in the ECtHR,
France and the British House of Lords. In the UK in particular the House of Lords is more
prone to adopt a broad brush balancing approach. Moreover, even where proportionality is
applied British courts appear to be more forgiving of government assertions than in other
41

The French case example is complex however. Although in proportional terms the French government wins at
the highest rate, in absolute terms the French government has lost more security versus rights cases than the UK
government since 2000: 13 versus 12, respectively.
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countries except France. Hence, the importance of proportionality and the impact it has on
case outcomes varies depending the jurisdiction.

Fourth, while all jurisdictions have some concept of deference, margin of appreciation or
evaluative leeway, there are significant differences between these jurisdictions as to how
these ideas are applied, articulated and understood. As a supra-national court the ECtHR
has developed the margin of appreciation doctrine in order to afford greater respect to the
democratic decisions of the signatory states to the Convention. The British House of Lords
has developed a strong and autonomous concept of “judicial deference,” and references to
deference have been frequent in human rights decisions since the HRA entered into force in
2000. The Spanish constitutional court splits its jurisprudence between greater deference to
legislative decisions and close scrutiny of administrative decisions. The German FCC does
not use the term deference, but applies a very narrow concept of evaluative leeway which is
interpreted in light of the right to “effective legal protection.” The term déference does not
appear in French law, however the Conseil d’Etat affords the administration some evaluative
leeway in its decision-making. The Conseil constitutionnel is also conscious of the
respective competences of the branches of government and will sometimes refrain from
substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature.

Fifth, the decisive factor in determining the importance of proportionality and the approach of
courts in human rights versus security cases across jurisdictions is the existence of a
domestic charter of rights. Courts with constitutional systems that include their own charter
of rights – such as in Germany and Spain – are more consistent and rigorous in their
application of proportionality to rights versus security cases than other jurisdictions which rely
solely on the ECHR. This is almost certainly linked to the fact that courts under these
domestic constitutions are vested with significant constitutional authority to scrutinize their
respective governments and parliaments in the light of constitutional rights. As a
consequence, a “British Bill of Rights” would most likely result in stricter rights protections in
British courts.

Sixth, proportionality analysis varies depending on the right in question as well as the
relevant jurisdiction.
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•

Torture: courts across all jurisdictions are consistent in their view that questions of
security cannot be a basis for limiting the rights provided under Article 3 ECHR or
other prohibitions on torture, and that the right to be free form torture is not subject to
balancing exercises. Nevertheless, in both the German and the ECHR jurisprudence,
proportionality of the penalty to the crime does enter into the equation when
interpreting whether treatment constitutes torture.

•

Liberty: all jurisdictions apply the doctrine of proportionality to the question of
whether states fall within the exceptions to the right to liberty, however the intensity of
proportionality review varies considerably across jurisdictions. At one end of the
spectrum the ECtHR and the UK courts are inclined to balance rights and interests
against each other, while at the other end of the spectrum the German court applies a
strict necessity test for any deprivation of liberty

•

Fair trial rights: fair trial rights are frequently subjected to a proportionality analysis.
However, in the ECtHR, the UK and Spain there is a considerable blurring of
balancing and proportionality. The German FCC on the other hand applies a strict
proportionality test and frequently returns to the important idea of the “core of the
right” when determining restrictions on fair trial rights. France has not applied
proportionality to fair trial rights although this is more indicative of the hesitancy of the
French courts to look behind the reasoning of governmental decisions, than of any
hostility to proportionality per se.

•

Privacy: A rigorous proportionality test has played a decisive role in protecting the
privacy related rights of applicants in Germany, Spain and, to a lesser extent, France.
In the UK the doctrine has not been as consistently or strictly applied. While the Daly
case has shown a stringent application of proportionality review, other cases tend
towards a balancing of privacy rights against security measures. The ECtHR's
position is also unclear. In Klass, the ECtHR refers not to proportionality, but to strict
necessity – yet in Segerstedt-Wiberg, proportionality and strict necessity are both
required.

•

Family life: The French and ECtHR cases demonstrate that family life cases,
perhaps more than any other human right, are determined predominantly by the
application of proportionality strictu sensu, rather than by questions of the legitimacy
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and necessity of the rights limiting measures cited by states. In applying the narrow
proportionality test both the ECtHR and the French courts adopt a broad multi-factor
balancing enquiry.
•

Expression: Courts in all selected jurisdictions apply the proportionality analysis
most rigorously and consistently with respect to freedom of speech. They are also
less inclined to develop a strong doctrine of deference or evaluative leeway in this
context. Despite this, courts in all jurisdictions are also broadly sympathetic to the
states’ need to restrict freedom of expression where potential or actual terrorist
activity is involved.

•

Association: The ECtHR has the most stringent proportionality requirements with
respect to freedom of association relative to the other jurisdictions in this selection.
However, it is difficult on the sample available to draw very clear comparative
conclusions. In all cases where the restriction on the right to association was upheld,
the organisations in question were characterised by the courts as posing a threat to
the basic democratic values of the State.
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Annex 1: Methodology
For each jurisdiction in this study, the first goal of our research was to identify cases in which
human rights were in conflict – at least potentially – with security. Although the project is
specifically focused on how the legal concept of proportionality mediates this conflict, not all
rights-versus-security cases are dealt with by courts using proportionality. All cases in which
rights and security were in conflict, not merely those involving proportionality, have been
included in our study. After all, it is impossible to understand how proportionality is used by
courts without noting which cases do not involve proportionality, as well as those that do.

Before we could create a list of cases involving a conflict between human rights and security,
we had to be able to answer the questions: What are human rights? and What is security?
We have taken a broad view of both. In essence, we have allowed the courts themselves to
answer these questions. If a court claims that a case involves rights or security, we do not
question that position. As a doctrinal matter, human rights in the jurisdictions studied are
protected either by the ECHR, domestic legislation, a domestic constitution, or some
combination of the three. These legal instruments define what is and is not a human right.

As for security, we have once again followed the lead of courts: if they say that security is a
concern, we assume that to be true. Building also on previous work done by some of our
team [Lazarus and Goold], we have arrived at a conception of security that includes such
diverse concerns as prevention of crime, border security, prison discipline, and responses to
terrorism.

Our definitions of human rights and security are necessarily broad. In practice, however, the
cases we have identified across jurisdictions tend to converge on certain rights and certain
security concerns. As shown in the report, some rights conflict with security more often than
others.

Our research into case law from the jurisdictions studied was restricted to two categories of
cases: first, all human rights versus security cases from 2000 to the present; second,
important cases in the area of human rights and security that were decided before 2000.
These restrictions were driven by two competing desires. The first is our desire to provide a
useful comparison between jurisdictions. Since our study is designed to provide guidance to
British policy-makers, UK jurisprudence is the touchstone of our work. We therefore chose
the year 2000 as the start date for our research because that is when the Human Rights Act
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came into effect in this country. In order to make a meaningful comparison between
jurisdictions, we felt it necessary to use the same starting date across the board.

However, we are also aware that courts in every jurisdiction have been dealing with human
rights and security since well before 2000. Often, key principles and concepts were
developed many years ago. Given that fact, limiting our analysis to only cases decided since
the year 2000 would provide an incomplete view of the jurisprudence. For that reason, we
decided to include a selection of key cases from before 2000. Selecting these cases
required attention to several factors: in many jurisdictions, the most significant factor was
citation in later decisions. If a pre-2000 case was cited as determining a principle of law that
bears on the rights versus security conflict, we included that older case in our data. Another
factor in our search for older cases was academic literature. We have consulted secondary
sources in each jurisdiction, both in English and in the relevant local languages. Cases
described as important by this academic literature were also included, even if they were
decided before 2000. Regardless, for the sake of consistency, our empirical analysis of the
case law focuses on only cases decided since the year 2000.

We also decided to focus only on decisions by courts of final appeal in each jurisdiction.
Doing so allowed us to see what the law is in each jurisdiction without becoming mired in
intermediate appellate decisions. This limitation also has the advantage of reducing the
impact of differences in judicial systems. Countries might have various levels of appeals and
a variety of ways of conceiving the appellate process: by focusing only on courts of final
appeal, we were able to minimize the impact of these differences.

Keeping all of these considerations in mind, our first task was to create a list of cases in each
jurisdiction that involved a potential conflict between rights and security. We assigned a
researcher to each of our five jurisdictions: the UK, the ECtHR, Spain, France, and Germany.
Each researcher is fluent in the language of his or her jurisdiction. We began our research
by reviewing academic literature on the various jurisdictions. In addition to scholarly articles,
we also reviewed reports by government agencies concerning human rights and security.
For example, we began our research on UK cases by reading the DCA’s Review of the
Implementation of the Human Rights Act, the Anthony Rice Report, and the Home Office’s
Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System. These secondary sources provided not only
background to our study, but also pointed us to a number of cases to include in our lists.

We then turned to legal databases to flesh out our lists. Different databases exist in each
jurisdiction, so the details of how we used these sources necessarily vary. However, the
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general method was consistent and can be illustrated by our research of cases from both the
House of Lords and from the ECtHR. For our research of British cases, we used two
commercial databases: Westlaw and Casetrack. For our research regarding the European
Court, we used the Court’s own publicly available database, HUDOC.42

Our research using the databases began by listing cases that were classified under the
keyword human rights. We then narrowed that case list to those that included the terms
security, proportionality, or balancing. This narrowing nonetheless left a large number of
cases to be considered, sometimes well into the hundreds. The next step, then, was to read
the fact sections and initial arguments of each case to determine whether it presented a
conflict between rights and security. If it did, it was included in our list of cases for that
jurisdiction. This manual analysis of the case law was time-consuming but resulted in a
much more accurate sample than would have been possible had we relied entirely on
computerized keyword and text searches.

The final stage of our list-making occurred as we read the cases already identified. These
cases often cited previous cases involving conflicts between rights and security; so long as
the cited cases met our criteria for date or importance, we added them to the list as well.
This recursive process provided a check on our prior list-making; it ensured that we included
all cases that the courts themselves considered important.

Having made lists of relevant cases for each jurisdiction, the next task was to transform them
into data that could be used for analysis and comparison. We constructed a data matrix –
essentially a database – for each jurisdiction. Our researchers read the cases and input data
into the matrices as they did so. They answered the following questions for each case:

(a) What jurisdiction?
(b) What is the case name?
(c) What court?
(d) What is the citation?
(e) What are the facts?
(f) What human rights issues are in question?
(g) Does the government argue that security is at stake?

42

German databases included Beck Online and the website of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de). French materials were accessed through Legifrance
(www.legifrance.gouv.fr). Spanish databases included that of the Spanish Constitutional Court
(www.boe.es/g/es/bases_datos/tc.php) and the Spanish Supreme Court (www.poderjudicial.es/jurisprudencia/).
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(h) What legal system is applied by the court?
(i) Does the court use proportionality?
(j) Does the court use balancing?
(k) Does the court apply deference or a margin of appreciation?
(l) What is the holding or result?
(m) If there is a mixed result, what is it?
(n) What is the court’s reasoning?
(o) Are there any key quotes? If so, they are translated into English if necessary.
(p) Does anything else need to be noted about this case?

In total, our team collected, read, analyzed, and input data on 192 cases, 125 of which were
decided since the year 2000. This data alone marks an important contribution to scholarship.
Never before has such comprehensive and comparative data been collected either on
human rights cases or on proportionality.
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